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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction over this matter 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. Section 78-2-2(3)(i), as this is an 
appeal from a final judgment and order in a civil case. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
The three issues upon which the trial court ruled and which 
are now properly presented for review are: 
1. A surety is not liable on a Section 63-56-38 public 
project payment bond for damages to a subcontractor's equipment 
v^en the damage is caused by the general contractor's 
negligence. 
2. A surety is not liable on a Section 63-56-38 public 
project payment bond for damages to a subcontractor's equipment 
when the damage is caused by the general contractor's breach of 
contract. 
3. A surety is entitled to escrow funds under the 
principles of subrogation, exoneration and quia timet, where the 
escrow funds were paid by the owner, where the surety has fully 
performed under its bond obligations, and where the surety has 
fulfilled the obligations of the general contractor and paid 
proper bond claims. 
Respondent Reliance Insurance Co. (hereinafter "Reliance") 
is dissatisfied with Appellants Transport Leasing Company's and 
Transystems, Inc.'s (hereinafter "Transport") characterization 
of the issues and therefore provides this statement of issues 
pursuant to Rule 24(b) of the Rules of the Utah Supreme Court. 
Transport's statement of the issues mischaracterizes the issues 
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which were decided by the District Court and are beyond the 
proper standard of review. See Standard of Review argument 
infra at 9-11. Reliance's statement of issues accurately 
reflects those issues decided by the District Court. See Order 
Granting Partial Summary Judgment, attached and marked Addendum 
"A" at paragraph 2 and 3; Final Order and Judgment, attached and 
marked Addendum "B" at paragraph 2. 
STATEMENT OF DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
Utah Code Ann. Section 63-56-38 (1986 Replacement) 
(attached and marked as Addendum nCff) is determinative of the 
issues on appeal in this case: 
63-56-38. Bonds necessary when contract 
is awarded. 
(1) When a construction contract is awarded, 
the following bonds or security shall be 
delivered to the state and shall become 
binding on the parties upon the execution 
of the contract: 
. . . 
(b) a payment bond satisfactory to 
the state . . . for the protection of 
all persons supplying labor and material 
to the contractor or its subcontractors for 
the performance of the work provided for 
in the contract. 
. . . 
(3) Any person who has furnished labor 
or material to the contractor or sub-
contractor for the work provided for in 
the contract, in respect of which a 
payment bond is furnished under this 
section, who has not been paid in full 
therefor within 90 days from the date on 
which the last of the labor was performed 
by him or material was supplied by him for 
which the claim is made, may sue on the 
payment bond for any amount unpaid at the 
time the suit is instituted and may 
prosecute the action for the amount due 
him. Any person having a contract with a 
subcontractor of the contractor, but not 
express or implied contract with the con-
tractor furnishing the payment bond, has 
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a right of action upon the payment bond 
upon giving written notice to the con-
tractor within 90 days from the date on 
which such person performed the last of 
the labor or supplied the last of the 
material for which the claim is made. . . . 
Transport erroneously relies upon Utah Code Ann. Section 
14-1-13 (repealed 1987) and erroneously states that Section 
63-56-38 did not become effective until April 27, 1987. Brief 
of Appellants, p.3 at footnote. With the exception of minor 
changes which do not affect any issue before this Court, 
Sections 63-56-38 as quoted herein became effective July 1, 
1980. Section 63-56-2 (1986 replacement, Compiler's Notes) 
("The term 'effective date of this chapter [63-56-1 to 
63-56-73],' means July 1, 1980 . . . . " ) . L. A. Young's 
contract with the State was signed May 13, 1985, and is 
therefore governed by Sections 63-56-38. 
The Utah Procurement Code, of which Section 63-56-38 is a 
part, applies to "every expenditure of public funds . . . by any 
state agency under any contract." Utah Code Ann. Section 
63-56-2(2) (1986 replacement). The Utah Procurement Code 
superseded Section 14-1-13 as far as Section 14-1-13?s state 
provisions were concerned. From the Procurement Code's 
enactment until Section 14-1-13's repeal, Section 14-1-13 only 
applied to municipalities and not to state procurement. Section 
14-1-17 (1986 replacement) specifically provides that 14-1-13 
"shall apply only to those political entities not subject to the 
provisions of Chapter 56, Title 63." 
Transport also erroneously states that "it would be 
immaterial as to which [statute] was applicable." Brief of 
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Appellants, p.3 at footnote. If Section 14-1-13 were 
applicable, the prevailing party would receive attorneys fees. 
As much as respondent would like to recover what it has expended 
in this lengthy action, the applicable statute, Section 
63-56-38, does not provide for attorneys' fees. The applicable 
statute, therefore, is Section 63-56-38 of the Utah Procurement 
Code. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of Proceedings 
Transport Leasing Company and Transystems, Inc. 
(Transport), were plaintiffs in Civil No. 85-8421 (R. at 2-24) 
and defendants in Civil No. C87-1984 (R. at 447-461). They are 
appellants in this appeal. Respondent is Reliance Insurance 
Company (Reliance), who was defendant in Civil No. 85-8421 and 
plaintiff in Civil No. C87-1984. Transport filed the first 
complaint on December 13, 1985 (Civil No. 85-8421) (attached and 
marked Addendum "D"), alleging causes of action in negligence 
and breach of contract. Reliance filed its own action on March 
20, 1987 (Civil No. C87-1984), seeking to declare Reliance's 
rights in certain escrow funds to be superior and prior to all 
other competing rights. The two actions were subsequently 
consolidated. 
The District Court ruled on determinative issues in two 
orders. The first order was issued March 18, 1987. R. at 
298-299; Addendum "A." This order granted Reliance's Partial 
The record on appeal is abbreviated as "R." and is 
paginated according to the record on appeal. 
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Motion for Summary Judgment, ruled that a Section 63-56-38 
payment bond does not cover damage to equipment caused by 
negligence or breach of contract. The second order, the Final 
Order and Judgment, was issued September 14, 1987. R. at 
667-671; Addendum "B." In the Final Order, the District Court 
ordered that Reliance is entitled to all the funds in the escrow 
account based on its right of subrogation to the contract 
proceeds. Addendum "A," paragraph 2. All issues between 
Transport and Reliance were decided by summary judgment. 
Addendum ffB," paragraph 4. 
B. Relevant Facts 
The facts of this case and the parties involved are typical 
of construction contract disputes. A general contractor (L. A. 
Young Sons Construction Company, hereinafter "L. A. Young") 
contracted with an owner (State of Utah, hereinafter "the 
State") to build a section of highway. L. A. Young was required 
by statute to furnish bonds, and did furnish performance and 
payment bonds. L. A. Young was principal, the State was obligee 
and Reliance was surety. R. at 457; Payment Bond, attached and 
marked Addendum "E." 
L. A. Young entered into a Leasing Agreement (R. at 9-14; 
attached and marked Addendum "F") with Transport. The Leasing 
2 
Agreement was drafted by Transport's counsel. R. at 702. The 
Leasing Agreement provided that Transport would furnish trucks 
and belly-dump trailers to L. A. Young for handling and hauling 
g 
The record on appeal merely designates the deposition of 
Calvin L. Rampton as "R. at 706." Attached and marked Addendum 
"G" are the pertinent pages of Mr. Rampton's deposition. 
5 
sand, gravel, fill materials and similar substances for the 
highway project. Pursuant to the Leasing Agreement, Transport 
promised to provide maintenance, licensing, insurance, permits, 
drivers and two full-time supervisors to monitor L. A. Young's 
lease obligations. Addendum "F," paragraph 2. 
Transport claims that the rented equipment was damaged and 
that the "repairs to such tractor and trailer units . . . were 
caused by the negligence or intentional wrongdoing of L. A. 
Young Sons Construction Company. . . . " Addendum "D", page 3, 
paragraph 7. In addition to its claims of '"willful misconduct" 
and "negligence," Transport further claims that the alleged 
damage resulted from the "breach" of certain contractual 
provisions of the Leasing Agreement. Addendum "D", page 5, 
paragraph 10. 
During the course of the project and thereafter, a dispute 
arose between Transport and L. A. Young concerning the amounts 
due to Transport for the truck and trailer rental. Transport 
and L. A. Young agreed to have contract proceeds which were paid 
by the State deposited in an escrow account pending the 
resolution of the dispute. R. at 20-23; Escrow Agreement, 
attached and marked Addendum "H." Reliance stipulated to the 
amount of rent owed. R. at 550-552; Stipulation, attached and 
marked Addendum "I." The amount of rent owed to Transport is no 
longer disputed. 
During the course of construction, L. A. Young became 
unable, both financially and otherwise, to perform the work 
required on the project and to pay for the labor and materials 
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required. L. A. Young was unable to meet and fulfill its 
contractual obligations, and was in default of its contractual 
obligations. R. at 463, paragraph 4. 
Pursuant to its suretyship duties under the payment and 
performance bonds, Reliance financially assisted L. A. Young, 
paid material suppliers and laborers, and performed the 
obligations of L. A. Young under the contract. In the course of 
completing performance on the contract, Reliance expended its 
own money and incurred a loss of more than $1.2 million. R. 
at 464, paragraphs 5 and 6. 
Certain officers and others associated with L. A. Young 
executed two indemnity agreements in favor of Reliance. R. 
at 534 and 538; Indemnity Agreements, attached and marked 
Addendum "J." Under the fourth paragraph of the Indemnity 
Agreement, L. A. Young assigned to Reliance all right, title, 
and interest of L. A. Young in the contract payments from the 
State. The sixth paragraph of the Indemnity Agreements provides 
that the entire contract price of the contracts referred to in 
any bonds are impressed with a trust in favor of the surety 
(Reliance) for payment of obligations incurred for labor, 
material, and services in the performance of the contract*work 
for which the surety would be liable under the bonds and for the 
purpose of satisfying the conditions of the bond executed in 
connection with the contract. 
C. Disposition of the Trial Court 
All issues between Transport and Reliance were decided by 
summary judgment. Through the Final Order and Judgment the 
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District Court ruled that Reliance is entitled to all of the 
funds in the escrow account based upon its rights of subrogation 
to the contract proceeds. The District Court ruled that the 
statutory payment bonds do not cover damage to equipment caused 
by negligence or misuse of L. A. Young, or damage caused by any 
breach of contract, and that Reliance is not liable therefor. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The critical question in this case is whether Reliance is 
liable for damages to Transport's equipment. Transport does not 
allege the damages were caused by Reliance; Transport claims 
Reliance is liable under the statutory payment bond. 
The legal issue is not whether a surety is liable for costs 
of repair to equipment. The issue is whether a surety is liable 
on a statutory payment bond for damages (repairs) caused by the 
principal's negligence or breach of contract. 
As a matter of surety law, a surety is not liable on its 
payment bond for the negligent or willful misconduct of the 
principal. Therefore, Reliance is not liable on the payment 
bond for damages caused to Appellant's equipment as the result 
of L. A. Young's negligence. 
Likewise, a surety is not liable on its payment bond for 
damages caused by the principal's breach of contract. Reliance, 
therefore, is not liable on the payment bond for damages caused 
to Appellant's equipment as a result of L. A. Young's breach of 
contract. 
Even if this Court refuses to rule that a surety is not 
liable for a principal's negligence, as a matter of law Reliance 
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is still not liable under the statutory payment bond for repairs 
to Appellant's equipment. 
In addition, a surety is entitled to contract proceeds 
under the principles of subrogation, exoneration and quia timet 
when the surety has stepped into the principal's shoes by 
fulfilling the principal's obligations. Reliance assumed the 
obligations of L. A. Young by completing the work and paying the 
debts of L. A. Young. Through the principles of subrogation, 
exoneration and quia timet, as well as the indemnity agreements 
it executed with L. A. Young, Reliance has prior and superior 
rights to the funds which were placed in escrow. 
These issues—no liability for negligence or breach of 
contract and the surety's legal right to the escrow funds—were 
the only issues which were decided by the District Court. 
Moreover, these issues were properly decided on summary 
judgment, there being no genuine issue as to any material fact. 
Notwithstanding the facts which Transport may assert, Reliance 
is entitled to the order and judgment received as a matter of 
law. 
DETAIL OF ARGUMENT 
I. Under the Proper Standard of Review 
the Final Order and Judgment Should be Affirmed 
Although this Court may view the evidence in the light most 
favorable to the losing party, it should still find the District 
Court properly granted summary judgment. In reviewing this 
case, this Court should find that summary judgment was proper 
since there are no genuine issues of material fact and Reliance 
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is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. R. Utah S.C. 3(a); 
Utah R. Civ. Proc. 56(c). 
Review is limited to issues pertaining to final orders and 
judgments. The two final orders and judgments of the District 
Court are the Final Order and Judgment and the Order Granting 
Partial Judgment in Favor of Defendant Reliance Insurance 
Company. Addenda "A" and ffB." The legal issues upon which the 
District Court ruled as final and which may be properly reviewed 
by this Court are fully set forth in the Statement of Issues in 
this Respondent's Brief. These legal issues are: (1) whether a 
surety is liable for the principal's negligence, (2) whether a 
surety is liable for the principal's breach of contract, and (3) 
whether a surety is entitled to escrow funds where the surety is 
subrogated to the principal's rights. 
Only facts which pertain to these issues on appeal are 
material. Transport alleges many facts in its brief and 
attempts to establish a cause of action in negligence against L. 
A. Young. See Brief of Appellants, p.7 and 8. The fact that L. 
A. Young may have committed the acts which are alleged in 
Transport's brief has no bearing on the legal issues decided by 
the District Court. The District Court ruled that a surety is 
not liable for a principal's negligence. That is the issue 
before this Court; the issue is not whether L. A. Young, the 
principal, was negligent. Only disputes over facts which might 
affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will 
properly preclude entry of summary judgment. Unnecessary or 
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irrelevant disputes should not be considered. L & A Drywall 
Inc. v, Whitmore Construction Co., 608 P.2d 626 (Utah 1980). 
In addition, more than two and one half years passed 
between the time Transport filed its complaint and the time the 
Final Order and Judgment was issued. Transport had ample time 
to present material facts and argue its points. The District 
Judge had all the material facts, issues and arguments before it 
when he ruled on summary judgment. An appeal to the Supreme 
Court is not the place to raise new issues and arguments. 
Transport cannot prevail on appeal by raising issues and 
arguments that it did not raise below. See Yost v. State, 640 
P.2d 1044, 1046 (Utah 1981); L & A Drywall Inc. v. Whitmore 
Construction Co., 608 P.2d 626, 629 (Utah 1980). Transport 
failed to dispute the facts set forth by Reliance at the time of 
the summary judgment hearing. Transport also failed to present 
evidence on issues where it would carry the burden at trial. In 
short, this case was ripe for summary judgment. As stated by 
the United States Supreme Court: 
Summary Judgment procedure is properly 
regarded . . . as an integral part of the 
Federal Rules as a whole, which are de-
signed to "secure the just, speedy and 
inexpensive determination of every 
action." 
Celotex Corp. v. Catratt, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 2555 (1986). 
This Court should also focus only on facts which are 
material to those issues which were the subject of a final 
determination by the District Court. 
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II. Transport's Claim is Contrary to the Proper 
Nature and Function of Sureties and Payment Bonds 
The answers to the legal questions before this Court are 
found in surety law. An understanding of the nature and 
function of sureties and payment bonds is an essential 
foundation for determining the issues here on appeal. 
A surety is a special kind of accommodation party; it is 
different from an insurer, indemnitor or endorser. Construction 
& Design Law Section 31.1a (1986). Moreover, a surety's 
responsibilities and liabilities depend upon the type of bond in 
question. In the case at bar, this Court will be dealing with a 
statutory payment bond. 
The necessity for and the terms of a statutory bond are 
prescribed by statute. Capriotti, Lemon & Associates v. Johnson 
Service Co., 84 Nev. 318, 440 P.2d 386 (1968). In a statutory 
bond, the liability of the surety will depend not only upon the 
terms of the bond but also upon the terms of the statute and 
principles of public policy. Employment Security Commission v. 
C.R. Davis Contracting Co., 81 N.M. 23, 462 P.2d 608 (1969). 
The terms of the statute requiring the bond will be read into it 
as if they were expressly included in the bond. Houston General 
Insurance Co. v. Maples, 375 So. 2d 1012 (Miss. 1979). 
The terms of the payment bond itself limit payment to labor 
or materials provided in the "prosecution of the work provided 
for in [the] contract." Addendum "E." The bond limits 
Reliance's liability according to the governing statute, which 
statute also limits coverage to labor and materials supplied 
"for the performance of the work provided for in the contract." 
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Utah Code Ann. Section 63-56-38(1)(b). Damages for negligence 
or even repairs were not provided for in the contract, bond or 
statute. 
Statutes which require bonds also set rules for recovery on 
them. For example, notice requirements are set forth so that 
the surety and contractor will know of the claims against them. 
Similarly, limitation periods are established. The limitations 
found in bonding statutes are quite often shorter than the 
statutes of limitations governing contracts generally. Thus, 
the surety will often benefit from the statutory requirements. 
On public construction projects, the bond provides 
protection for laborers and material suppliers who could not 
file a lien on the public property and could not otherwise 
recover for their services if the contractor became insolvent. 
Courts have no problem in allowing recovery on a payment bond to 
claimants who have furnished materials which go directly into 
the work and become part of the finished structure. These 
claimants are entitled to a mechanics' lien on private projects, 
and it is primarily for their benefit that payment bonds are 
executed on public projects. At one time, these claimants were 
the only people entitled to sue on the payment bond. In some 
jurisdictions, absent sovereign immunity, recovery on the 
payment bond is still limited to those claimants who could 
validly execute a lien under the applicable lien law. See 
Norris v. Depew Paving Co. 14 A.D.2d 117, 217 N.Y.S.2d 203 
(1961), afffd, 11 N.Y.2d 812, 182 N.E.2d 109, 227 N.Y.S.2d 436 
(1962). 
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The law governing recovery under statutory payment bonds, 
therefore, is unique. Recovery is expressly limited by the 
terms of the statute. Likewise, the surety's liability is not 
all-inclusive; its role is well defined and limited. 
II. A Surety is not Liable on a Payment 
Bond for Damages to a Subcontractor's 
Equipment when the Damage is caused by 
General Contractor's Negligence 
A. Utah Code Ann. Section 63-56-38 
Limits Recovery on its Payment Bond 
to "Furnished Labor or Material" 
The ultimate issue in this case is whether Reliance is 
liable for damages caused by L. A. Young's negligence or breach 
of contract. Because Transport's cause of action is created by 
statute, Transport's claim must be based upon, and is limited 
by, the applicable statute which created the cause of action. 
First Security Mortgage Co. v. Hansen, 361 P.2d 919 (Utah 1981). 
The statute under which Transport's cause of action was 
created also limits Transport's cause of action by (1) subject 
and (2) limitation period. In Section 63-56-38(4), the statute 
limits the time for filing suit under the statute to one year. 
In Section 63-56-38(3), the statute limits the subject—what is 
covered by the bond--to labor or materials furnished for the 
work provided in the contract. The statute limits—not 
expands—the Reliance's exposure to liability. 
The statute provides recovery only for payment to "persons 
supplying labor and material . . . for the performance of the 
work provided for in the contract." Utah Code Ann. Section 
63-56-38. The statute clearly and specifically covers only 
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labor and material which were supplied for the performance of 
the work provided for in the contract. Clearly, claimed damages 
to heavy equipment caused by the contractor's negligence is not 
"work provided for in the contract." 
B. Reliance is not Liable for L. A. Young's Negligence 
Many cases hold that the statutory bond required in the 
case of public works does not render the surety liable for 
injuries to property or repairs to the claimant's property due 
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to the contractor's negligence. 
Of particular help are two recent cases which directly 
analyze the issue of whether a surety is liable for damages 
caused by the principal's negligence. The first case, Sim's 
Crane Service Inc. v. Reliance Insurance Co., 667 F.2d 30 (11th 
Cir. 1982), involved facts very similar to those which are now 
before this Court. A lessor, like Transport, leased heavy 
equipment, a crane, to a subcontractor. Also like the case now 
Sim's Crane Service, Inc. v. Reliance Insurance Co.f 667 
F.2d 30, 32 (11th Cir. 1982) ("The terms of the surety bond, 
therefore, do not indicate an intention to benefit materialmen 
whose property is damaged as the result of a subcontractor's 
negligence."); Wyatt & Kipper Engineers, Inc. v. Ramstad 
Construction Co., 194 F. Supp. 379, 382 (D. Alaska 1961) ("On 
the other hand, it is held that there is no such remedy against 
the surety for breach of contract pertaining to labor or 
materials furnished, such as damages for delay, or failure to 
take and pay for equipment never received, or for negligence."); 
J. W. Crowder v. Fidelity and Deposit Co., 144 F. Supp. 322, 329 
(W.D. La. 1956) ("[T]he surety company's liability would be 
limited to the claims based on work done and material furnished 
as distinguished from claims based upon negligence and breach of 
contract."); Coken v. Di Sandro, 88 F. Supp. 970 (D. Conn. 1949) 
("The second count is founded in part on negligence and cannot 
be said to be for material and labor furnished."); City of 
Oneonta v. P. A. Buchanan Contracting Co., 318 So. 2d 267, 269 
(Ala. 1975) ("A public works bond surety is not liable to third 
parties for injuries caused by negligence of the [continued on 
following page] 
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before this Court, the crane "was damaged at the job site as a 
result of alleged negligent operation by the subcontractor's 
employees." Id. at 31. 
Certain facts in the Sim's case were very favorable to the 
subcontractor. For example, the language of the bond expressly 
provided for "the payment of all persons furnishing materials 
for the prosecution of the work provided for in the general 
contract including 'repairs on machinery.'" Id* Notwithstanding 
these facts, the Court of Appeals ruled that the surety should 
not be responsible for repairs caused by negligence. 
The Court of Appeals followed what it called the "general 
rule": 
[W]hile there may be a recovery on a 
public contractor's bond for material 
and labor used in incidental and current 
repairs to the contractor's machinery, 
there can be none for major repairs 
involving the replacement of old with 
new parts, in the absence of proof that 
the new parts were consumed in the work 
covered by the bond. The determinative 
distinction is between the items going 
into the work, or specifically contri-
buting to the execution of the contract 
and nothing else, and those properly 
chargeable to the plant and equipment of 
the contractor, and available not only 
for the pending work but also for other 
work as well. 
contractor-principal."); McGee Steel Co. v. McDonald Industries 
Alaska, Inc., 723 P.2d 611, 618 (Alaska 1986) ("We conclude that 
a subcontractor's negligent damage to a major piece of equipment 
was not an expense which [the surety] should have expected."); 
Healy Plumbing and Heating Co. v. Minneapolis-Saint Paul 
Sanitary District, 169 N.W.2d 50 (Minne. 1969) (Public liability 
or damage claims based upon negligence or accidents which arise 
out of the performance of a bonded project are not proper bond 
claims.). 
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Id. at 32 (quoting Western Casualty & Surety Co. v. Fullton, 60 
6a. App. 710, 712, 4 S.E.2d 690f 691 (1930)). 
The Court of Appeals supported the general rule with this 
sound reasoning: 
Similarly, the surety, in executing the 
payment bond, did not intend to insure 
materialmen against the negligence of 
subcontractors or underwrite a liability 
policy for subcontractors. To require 
payment from the surety to lessor ma-
terialmen for machinery repair costs, 
whenever a subcontractor damages the 
machinery, would unduly enlarge the 
risk undertaken by the surety for which 
it was compensated. 
Id. at 32. 
The second case, McGee Steel Co. v. McDonald Industries 
Alaska Inc., 723 P.2d 611 (Alaska 1986), follows the rule and 
reason of Sim's. The McGee facts are also very similar to those 
facts now before this Court. In McGee, a lessor leased heavy 
equipment to a subcontractor. The public project required that 
a payment bond be issued according to the terms of a "Little 
Miller Act," a statute which is very much like the statute at 
issue in this case. Like Utah's payment bond statute, Alaska 
Stat. Section 36.25.010 also requires the contractor to furnish 
a payment bond "for the protection of all persons who provide 
labor and material in the prosecution of the work provided for 
in the contract." 
Much of the McGee case is devoted to questions of liability 
as between the lessee and the lessor. However, the McGee court 
does not stop with a determination that the principal is or is 
not liable to the lessor for repair costs and then automatically 
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assess the surety with liability. The McGee court takes the 
next step and discusses the extent of the surety's liability, 
recognizing that a surety's liability on a statutory payment 
bond is limited. 
In the case now before this Court, Transport strenuously 
argues that L. A. Young was negligent. That may or may not be 
so. However, Transport must realize that rejpair costs caused by 
negligence are beyond the surety's scope of liability. The 
McGee court analyzed the issue and held: 
The question in this case is 
whether damage to the crane caused 
by any negligence of [the principal] 
can be considered an "expected con-
sumption" of the equipment on the 
job. We conclude that a subcon-
tractor's negligent damage to a 
major piece of equipment was not an 
expense which [the surety] should 
have expected. Therefore, [the 
surety] is not liable for these 
repair costs. 
McGee, 723 P.2d at 618. 
Transport has continuously alleged "excessive," 
"extensive," "extraordinary" and "negligent" damage to its 
equipment. The cases which have been cited hold that a surety 
is not liable for the principal's negligence because a surety's 
liability under a statutory payment bond is limited. As a 
matter of law, a surety is not liable for damages caused by 
negligence. 
Even in light of this "general rule," Sim's, 667 F.2d at 
30, Transport has chosen to rely heavily on an older case from 
Rhode Island, Moran Towing Corp. v. M. A. Gammino Construction 
Co., 363 F.2d 108 (1st 1966) (hereinafter "Moran 3"). 
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The five Moran cases deal mainly with negligence and 
apportionment of damages. Moran Towing Corp. v. M. A. Gammino 
Construction Co., 204 F. Supp. 353 (1962) (hereinafter "Moran 
1") , initially held that a subcontractor has no remedy against a 
surety on a Miller Act bond for recovery of damages caused by 
the principal's negligence. Id. at 356. However, in granting 
the defendant surety company's motion to dismiss, the Court also 
granted leave to the plaintiff to amend its complaint to allege 
a proper bond claim action. In the case at bench, Transport's 
motion to amend its complaint was denied. Transport has not 
appealed that order. 
Moran Towing Corp. v. M. A. Gammino Construction Co., 244 
F. Supp. 729 (D.R.I. 1965) (hereinafter "Moran 2"), consolidated 
Moran 1 with another action which was brought in admiralty. The 
Moran 2 court did not address the issue of the surety's 
liability for the principal's negligence. 
In Moran 3, the court did address the issues which now 
concern the case at bar. The court acknowledged many cases 
which hold that a surety is not liable for the principal's 
negligence and noted the risk of creating "an entirely new type 
of insurance coverage." Id., at 115. The court even recognized 
that the Miller Act was meant as a substitute for liens which 
might otherwise have been claimed against the government. 
However, in recognizing this substitution, the court failed to 
recognize that such a recovery for negligence under the Miller 
Act would not be available under a typical mechanics' lien 
recovery. 
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The court rationalized the general rule which prohibits 
recovery on a bond on account of a principal's negligence by 
reasoning that the principal had assumed the potential costs of 
its negligence as a portion of its own contract. The fact that 
a principal may agree to pay for its own negligence does not 
change the sound law that a payment bond surety is not and 
should not be liable for the principal's negligence. 
The two subsequent Moran cases, Moran Towing Corp. v. M. A. 
Gammino Construction Co., 292 F. Supp. 134 (D.R.I. 1968) and 
Moran Towing Corp. v. M. A. Gammino Construction Co., 409 F.2d 
917 (1969) dealt only with apportionment of damages issues; that 
is, which portion of damages were attributable to the contractor 
and which were attributable to the equipment supplier. 
Only a brief passage in Moran 3 addresses the issues which 
are before this court. The Moran 3 decision looked at the law 
which states that a surety is not liable for negligence and then 
looked at the law which states that in certain situations a 
surety may be liable for a subcontractor's equipment repair. 
However, the decision did not adequately examine the 
determinative issue before this Court of whether a surety is 
liable for a subcontractor's repair of equipment, when the 
repair is caused by the principal's negligence. 
Moreover, even if this court were to accept the Moran 
minority decision as law, the ultimately critical facts which 
were present in that case are not present in the case at bar. 
In the Moran cases, the contractor expressly accepted the 
responsibility for its own negligence and contracted to pay for 
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that negligence. In the case before this Court, no such express 
assumption was made. In the Moran cases, the record does not 
mention if insurance was required to be carried by the 
principal. In the case at bar, Transport, not L. A. Young, 
expressly agreed, by the terms of its own lease, that it would 
provide insurance. Transport certainly cannot argue now that 
Reliance assumed the position of an insurer when it is obvious 
that Transport by its own lease requirements had adequately 
provided for insurance. This argument appeared to be persuasive 
in the Moran decision. Transport's Lease Agreement expressly 
provided insurance for Transport's equipment; Reliance did not 
expressly or even impliedly assume the responsibilities of an 
insurer. 
The Moran decision should not be followed by this Court 
because it is: (1) minority law, (2) unpersuasive when 
confronted with the reasoning and policy of majority law, and 
(3) distinguishable from the case at bar as to critical facts, 
and (4) distinguishable from the case at bar as to the 
determinative issue. 
C. Recovery on a Statutory Payment Bond is Meant 
as a Substitute for Mechanics' Lien Rights; Transport 
Could not Recover Its Damages under Mechanics' Lien Law 
It is important to remember the reasons the Utah 
Procurement Code requires a payment bond on public projects. 
Material suppliers and subcontractors without contractual 
privity have no contractual recourse against a public entity. 
Moreover, subcontractors and material suppliers are prohibited 
from recording mechanics' liens on public property. Utah Code 
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Ann. Section 63-56-38(3), the payment bond statute, operates as 
a substitute for recording a mechanics' lien when subcontractors 
and material suppliers are not paid for labor or materials 
furnished on a public project. New England Explosives Corp. v. 
Maine Ledge Blasting Specialist, Inc., 542 F. Supp 1343 (D. Me. 
1982) (purpose of Miller Act is to provide persons supplying 
labor or materials with a suitable alternative to their state 
law mechanics' lien remedy). 
Section 63-56-38(3) acts as a substitute to the mechanics' 
lien rights which are not allowed on public projects. 
Therefore, if the "labor and materials furnished" definition of 
Section 63-56-38(3) needs amplification, it is reasonable to 
resort to the mechanics' lien statute, to apply, by analogy, the 
criteria of the mechanics' lien to the bond statute. "The 
presence or absence of a right to assert a mechanics' lien can 
be a guide to the interpretation of a payment bond." United 
States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Miller, 549 S.W.2d 316, 319 
(Ky. App. 1977). 
Although the Utah mechanics' lien statute lists many items 
and services upon which a contractor may base a mechanics' lien 
filing, no mention is made of negligence, breach of contract or 
even repairs. Utah Code Ann. Section 38-1-3 (1987 supp.) 
(Mechanics' Lien Statute, attached and marked Addendum "K"). By 
analogy, negligence, breach of contract and repairs should not 
be included within the scope of a payment bond provided by 
Section 63-56-38(3). To rule otherwise would be to give a 
claimant under a payment bond greater rights than a mechanics' 
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lien claimant would have under the mechanics' lien statute. 
This would be a truly incongruent result since Section 
63-56-38(3) was meant to substitute the mechanics' lien rights 
which are not available on public projects. L. W. Flynn v. 
W. P. Harlin Construction Co., 509 P.2d 356r 361 (Utah 1973) 
("The purpose of the statues requiring the bonds . . . is to 
provide the same protection to laborers and materialmen as to 
those involved in private contracts.") 
D. Reliance is Not an Insurer and Should 
Not be Forced to Perform as an Insurer 
The District Court's ruling that a surety is not liable for 
a principal's negligence or breach of contract is in no way a 
blind adherence to meaningless law. The rule that a surety is 
not liable for a principal's negligence or breach of contract is 
founded upon sound reasoning and public policy. 
First, Transport had adequate recourse for its loss. The 
Lease Agreement drafted by Transport specifically required 
Transport to furnish insurance for the trucks and trailers it 
rented to L. A. Young. Addendum "F," paragraph 2. In addition 
to a possible recovery against L. A. Young for L. A. Young's 
negligence, Transport could have also recovered from the 
insurance which Transport itself promised to provide or from any 
casualty or liability insurance L. A. Young had. Transport's 
Lease Agreement required Transport to carry liability insurance 
in recognition of the fact that negligence and breach of 
contract claims are not covered by the payment bond. In fact, 
standard form construction contracts include such provisions. 
See J. Sweet, Sweet on Construction Industry Contracts, 459-61 
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(1987), attached and marked Addendum "L." The fact that 
Transport did not pursue these avenues of recovery against 
insurance companies should not be grounds for an unprecedented 
recovery against a surety. 
Second, the increased premiums which would result from a 
ruling that sureties are liable for negligence and breach of 
contract would be an extreme financial burden on all 
contractors. To rule that a surety is liable for the negligence 
or breach of contract of the principal would substantially 
increase the surety's exposure to liability, forcing sureties 
either to raise bond premiums to cover the increased exposure or 
to refuse to write bonds. The subcontractors and suppliers who 
are supposed to benefit from the bond statute's protection would 
find the detriment outweighing the benefit. Contractors 
fortunate enough to obtain bonds would ultimately be forced 
either to pass the increased rate to the owner or to pay less to 
their subcontractors. 
The Sim's court had in mind the concept of limiting a 
surety's liability in order that the surety might better perform 
its obligations when it explained: 
To require payment from the surety to 
lessor materialman for machinery re-
pair costs, whenever a subcontractor 
damages the machinery, would unduly 
enlarge the risk undertaken by the 
surety for which it was compensated. 
Sim's, 667 F.2d at 32. 
Sureties are an interdependent part of the construction 
industry. Drastically changing the surety's responsibilities 
would damage, not benefit, the industry, with the ultimate 
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increased cost passed through to the taxpayer—the person who 
ultimately pays for public projects. 
A third reason underlying the District Court's ruling that 
a surety is not liable for the principal's negligence or breach 
of contract is that a surety should not be made to act the part 
of an insurer. Important distinctions exist between the 
function of sureties and insurers. This distinction carries 
over into the law which governs sureties. For example, in 
Meyer v. Building and Realty Service Co., 209 Ind. 125, 196 N.E. 
250 (1935), the Supreme Court of Indiana distinguished an 
insurance contract from a surety contract: 
A contract of surety creates a 
tripartite relation between the party 
secured, the principal obligor, and 
the party secondarily liable, and the 
rights, remedies, and defenses of a 
surety cannot be disassociated from 
his relationship even though you call 
the contract one of insurance. This 
tripartite relation is always present 
in a surety contract, while an in-
surance contract in itself never 
creates a tripartite relation ana-
logous to the surety relation . , . . 
Insurance has been defined as a contract 
whereby one undertakes to indemnify 
another against loss, damage, or I 
liability arising from an unknown or 
contingent event; whereas the contract 
of suretyship is one to answer for 
the debt, default, or miscarriage of 
another, and a contract of suretyship 
is not altered because it was made 
by a corporation for compensation. 
Id. 196 N.E. at 253. 
An insurer spreads the risk of certain loss among members 
of a class. The premium paid by a member of that class 
constitutes that person's proportionate share of the risk. A 
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surety does not anticipate certain loss as does the insurer. In 
fact, a surety, by definition, expects no loss. The premium 
paid to a surety is more a service charge or a fee and not 
compensation for undertaking a risk. Unlike an insurer who, 
having paid a loss, has no right of indemnification against its 
insured, the surety has every right and intention to pursue its 
principal and indemnitors until it is reimbursed. The functions 
of an insurer and a surety are substantially different. 
Reliance, a surety, should not be forced to perform the 
functions of an insurer. 
III. A Surety is not Liable on a Payment Bond for 
Damages to a Subcontractor's Equipment When 
the Damage is Caused by the General Contractor's 
Breach of Contract 
The reasoning underlying the argument that a breach of 
contract unrelated to the work is not a proper bond claim is 
similar to the reasoning underlying the argument that negligence 
is not a proper bond claim. Reliance's liability is limited to 
claims based on the work done or the materials furnished and 
should not be based upon the principal's negligence or breach of 
contract. Section 63-56-38 of the Utah Procurement Code created 
a cause of action not previously available at common law. 
Because it created the cause of action, recovery is limited to 
this statute's express terms. 
Utah Procurement Code states that even those who are not in 
privity of contract with the contractor are entitled to recover 
from the surety, if their claims are proper bond claims. In 
other words, material suppliers and labor suppliers to the 
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subcontractors of the principal contractor are entitled to 
recovery based upon the bond statute; the recovery is not based 
upon a contract between the parties. 
In a recent case where a concrete supplier on a public 
contract brought an action under the Miller Act, the court held 
that "one cannot recover damages for breach of contract on a 
bond required by the act." Mobile Premix Concrete, Inc. v. 
Santa Fe Engineers, Inc., 515 F. Supp. 512, 516 (D. Colo. 1981). 
In L. P. Friestedt Co. v. United States Fireproofing Co., 
125 F.2d 1010 (10th Cir. 1942), the plaintiffs-subcontractors 
had suffered increased costs for labor and material because of 
the general contractor's delay. The plaintiffs' complaint 
alleged that the prime contractor had breached its contract by 
the delay and thereby caused plaintiffs' damages. The court 
addressed plaintiffs' breach of contract issue and denied the 
plaintiffs' recovery. 
A claimant cannot recover damages for breach of contract on 
a bond that is required by statute. The reasoning behind this 
rule is aptly explained in Gutman v. P. J. Carling Co., 254 F. 
Supp. 1001, 1002 (D.N.Y. 1965) (emphasis in original): 
The bond furnished by them [the surety] 
is conditioned . . . for the payment of 
any sums due a subcontractor . . . for 
labor performed or materials furnished. 
The purpose and intent of the Miller Act 
is to protect subcontractors en-
gaged in federal construction projects 
against defaults in payment for labor 
or materials furnished by them, but not 
more . . . . 
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The District Court correctly ruled, as a matter of law, that a 
breach of contract unrelated to the work is not covered under a 
statutory payment bond. This Court should affirm that ruling. 
IV. Even if This Court Declines to Affirm the Trial 
Courtfs Ruling that a Surety is not Liable for a 
Principal's Negligence, as a Matter of Law Transport 
Still Cannot Recover Damages for Repairs 
The issue in this case is not, as Transport urges, whether 
a surety is liable for repairs made to a lessor's machinery. 
That is only half of the issue. The complete issue is whether a 
surety is liable for repairs caused by the principal's 
negligence. 
This complete issue is easily misconstrued because it 
comprises two areas of inquiry. The first inquiry is whether a 
surety is liable for repairs made to a lessor's equipment. The 
short answer to this inquiry is that it depends upon the type of 
repair. The second inquiry—which Transport overlooks—is the 
extent of the surety's liability. A statutory payment bond 
surety does not have unlimited liability. Law and reason have 
answered that a surety's liability does not extend to damages 
caused by the principal's negligence. All of the repairs for 
which Transport seeks recovery were caused, Transport claims, by 
the negligence of the contractor. Those kinds of repairs—by 
law—are not recoverable. 
Transport disregards the inquiry into the surety's extent 
of liability and assert that the "extensive," "extraordinary" 
and "negligent" damages "went into and became part of the 
project." Brief of Appellants at p. 12. Even if this Court 
were to disregard the law which cuts off a surety's liability 
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for a principal's negligence as a matter of law, Transport still 
cannot recover for its repairs as a matter of law. 
Transport relies on J. F. Tolton Investment Co. v. Maryland 
Casualty Co., 293 P. 611 (Utah 1930), in support of its position 
that the extraordinary damages to its trucks went into and 
became a part of the project. The Tolton facts are quite 
different from the facts of the case now before this Court. For 
example, in Tolton, no damages were caused by negligence. The 
materials claimed consisted of small bolts, nuts, hoses, valves 
and belts totaling $221.01 (Id. at 614), not entire belly-dump 
trailers. In fact, the holding of the Tolton case is more 
favorable to Reliance: 
Hence it is held that minor and inex-
pensive repairs which do not in any 
true sense add to the value of the 
equipment, but which are incidental 
to the use of machinery, are within 
the obligation of such bonds. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
In other words, major and expensive repairs which add to 
the value of the equipment and which are crucial to the use of 
the machinery are not within the obligation of such bonds. In 
allowing nuts and bolts to come under the payment bond, the 
Tolton Court carefully limited its decision (perhaps to avoid 
future abuse) by stating, "this does not include liability for . 
. . materials furnished which from their nature and use will not 
be consumed in the work." Tolton, 293 p. 612. 
Whether repairs (not repairs caused by the principal's 
negligence) are allowed under a payment bond usually depends 
upon the extent of the repair. Continental Casualty Co. v. 
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Clarence L. Boyd Co,, 140 F.2d 115, 116 (10th Cir. 1944) 
("Repair parts, appliances, and assessories which add materially 
to the value of the equipment and render it available for other 
work are not within the coverage of the payment bond provided 
for [by the statute]."); Roig v. Castro, 71 F. Supp. 36 (D.P.R. 
1947). One court ruled that equipment "which would not be 
expected to be substantially consumed during the construction 
project" is not a proper claim. Ibex Industries, Inc. v. Coast 
Line Waterproofing, 563 F. Supp. 1142, 1146 (D.D.C. 1983). 
Other courts have determined that "[t]he surety may not be 
liable for repairs made to equipment after completion of the 
work." Miller & Bentley Equipment Co. v. Kelly, 192 F. Supp. 
274, 275 (D. Alaska 1961). Some courts have stated that repairs 
or improvements which survive completion of the project are not 
within the terms of the bond. United States Fidelity & 
Guarentee v. Cagg, 75 P.2d 412, 414 (Okl. 1938). Still other 
courts deny recovery on the bond where the repairs make the 
equipment available to work not only on the bonded project, but 
also available for other work. Clifton v. Nordeny 226 N.W. 940, 
942 (Minn. 1929). The repairs claimed by Transport are major, 
they were not of the kind which are expected to be consumed, 
they were made after the project's completion and were available 
for other work. Accordingly, even disregarding the extent of 
liability issue, this Court should still find that the repairs 
are not a proper bond claim. 
Of particular help in deciding when repairs come under a 
statutory payment bond is the explanation given in A. L. Young 
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Machinery Co, v. Cupps, 2 P.2d 321, 323 (Cal. 1931) (quoting 
Dennis v. Enke, 224 N.W. 925): 
In order to create liability on the 
part of the surety for the purchase price 
of tools and appliances under these con-
tract bonds, at least the following el-
ements we think must be present: First, 
the tool or appliance must be purchased 
specifically and particularly for use in 
the performance of the particular contract; 
second, the use of such tool or appliance 
must be at least proper, if not reasonably 
necessary, in connection with and about the 
carrying out of the contract; third, the tool 
or appliance must be used in or about the 
performance of the contract; fourth, the 
tool or appliance must be such that it 
is reasonably to be expected in the 
natural course of events that its normal 
life for the purpose for which it was 
designed will be practically consumed 
by its use in and about the performance 
of the contract, and in this connection 
the facts of each particular case must 
be taken into consideration. 
Transport's belly-dump trailers are not minor "tools or 
appliances." The major repairs to Transport's trucks occurred 
after completion of the project. Repairs were extensive and 
survived the project. The repairs qualify as capital 
improvement, not as "incidental" repairs. The trucks were not 
"specifically and particularly" purchased for use in the 
project, and it cannot be said that the parties reasonably 
expected that in the normal course of events the trucks would be 
consumed in the project. As a matter of law, Transport's claims 
for repairs fail to qualify on all factors. 
Although statutory payment bonds are remedial in nature, 
they also contain defined limits. In carrying out the statute's 
purpose "unjust and absurd consequences are, if possible, to be 
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avoided and courts are not justified in writing liability into 
[these bonds]." Gray Bar Electric Co, v. John A. Volpe 
Construction Co., 387 F.2d 55, 58 (5th Cir. 1967). 
Reliance concedes that "minor and inexpensive repairs which 
do not in any true sense add to the value of the equipment" 
(Tolton, 293 P.2d at 614) may be covered by the payment bond. 
However, Transport expressly contracted through its lease 
agreement that it would "provide maintenance" for any such 
incidental repairs. Addendum "F," paragraph 2. 
Likewise, as a matter of law, Reliance is not liable for 
what Transport characterizes as "extraordinary" and "excessive" 
damages caused by the principal—particularly when Transport's 
repairs were made after completion of the project and were 
available for use on other projects. The repairs were either 
assumed by contract by Transport or they are beyond the scope of 
"incidental" repairs which are required by law to come under the 
payment bond. Therefore, even disregarding the extent of 
liability issue, Reliance is still not liable for Transport's 
claimed repairs as a matter of law. 
V. Reliance is Entitled to Escrow Funds Where the 
Funds are Contract Payments and Reliance Has 
Paid More Than One Million Dollars in Bond Claims 
A. Reliance is Entitled to the Escrow Funds 
Based upon Subrogation 
The District Court's Final Order and Judgment ordered that 
Reliance is entitled to all of the funds in the escrow account 
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based upon its rights of subrogation to the contract proceeds. 
Addendum "B". 
Reliance's right to the escrow funds is grounded in over a 
century of cases that establish a surety's interest in contract 
payments. At the head of these cases is Pearlman v. Reliance 
Insurance Company, 371 U.S. 132, 83 S. Ct. 232, 9 L. Ed. 2d 190 
(1962). In Pearlman, Reliance, as surety, had issued a 
performance bond and a payment bond for a contractor on a 
federal government construction project. These bonds were 
furnished by Reliance pursuant to the federal Miller Act, upon 
which Utah's payment bond statute, which is involved in this 
case, is patterned. The contractor had financial trouble and 
was unable to complete the project. Reliance was compelled to 
pay nearly $350,000 to discharge the debts of the contractor for 
labor and materials. The government held over $87,000 in 
retention, and turned that fund over to the contractor's trustee 
in bankruptcy. The trustee asserted that the retention funds 
vested in him. Reliance filed a petition alleging that the fund 
4. Transport argued in the District Court that Reliance could 
not be subrogated to the funds in the escrow account because 
Reliance had not paid Transport's claim. See Memorandum in 
Opposition to Reliance's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, 
Section II in No. C85-8421. Reliance proposed to pay 
Transport's rental hours claim in one of two way. Reliance 
could pay Transport from Reliance's own funds, whereupon it 
would be entitled to the contract funds in the escrow account 
under subrogation. Or, Reliance could, by the principle of 
exoneration, require the contract funds in the escrow account to 
be paid in satisfaction of Transport's claim, whereupon Reliance 
would be entitled to the balance in the escrow account by 
subrogation. Transcript of Proceedings on Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment, held July 10, 1987 (R. at 704, pp.2-5), at 
2-5, attached and marked as Addendum "M." Under either 
proposal, the result would be the same. 
33 
never vested in the trustee and that Reliance was the owner of 
the fund "free and clear" of the claims of the trustee or any 
other person. 
The Supreme court held for Reliance. In doing so it relied 
on two prior Supreme Court decisions holding that there is a 
security interest in a withheld fund to which the surety is 
subrogated. Prairie State Bank v. United States, 164 U.S. 227, 
17 S. Ct. 142, 41 L. Ed. 412 (1896), and Henningsen v. United 
States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 208 U.S. 404, 28 S. Ct. 389, 52 
L. Ed. 547 (1908). The court concluded: 
We therefore hold in accord with the 
established legal principles stated 
above that the Government had a right 
to use the retained fund to pay labor-
ers and materialmen; that the laborers 
and materialmen had a right to be paid 
out of the fund; that the contractor, 
had he completed his job and paid his 
laborers and materialmen, would have 
become entitled to the fund; and that 
the surety, having paid the laborers 
and materialmen, is entitled to the 
benefit of all these rights to the 
extent necessary to reimburse it. 
Consequently, since the surety in 
this case has paid out more than the 
amount of the existing fund, it has 
a right to all of it. 
371 U.S. at 141-142 (emphasis added). 
It does not matter that the District Court did not specify 
to whose rights Reliance became subrogated, because Reliance 
became subrogated to all these rights. Since Reliance has paid 
out more than the amount in the escrow account, Reliance has a 
right to all of it. 
Contract funds are impressed with an equity in favor of a 
paying surety. In Prairie State Bank, supra, the bank took an 
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assignment of the retainage fund in consideration of advances 
made by the bank to the contractor. With regard to that 
assignment, the court stated: 
Sundberg & Company [the contractor] 
could not transfer to the bank any 
greater rights in the fund than they 
themselves possessed. Their rights 
were subordinate to those of the 
United States and the sureties . . . 
[I]t necessarily results that the 
equity, if any, acquired by the 
Prairie Bank in the ten percent 
fund then in existence and there-
after to arise was subordinate to 
the equity which had . . . arisen 
in favor of the surety . . . . 
17 S. Ct. at 147. 
The escrow fund is derived from payments made by the State 
by joint check to L. A. Young and Transport. But that payment 
could convey no greater rights than the State or L. A. Young 
then had. That payment was impressed with the subrogation right 
of Reliance, which equitable lien is superior to the right of 
Transport. Reliance's right dates back to the execution of the 
bond. Salt Lake City v. O'Connor, 68 Utah 233, 249 P. 810, 817 
(1926). 
Reliance's equitable right was not extinguished by the 
State's payment to L. A. Young and Transport. The escrow 
account is a distinct and clearly identifiable fund. It is not 
like the payments that Transport had already received, which 
have been dissipated. The contract proceeds progressed no 
farther than the escrow account. Reliance's right of 
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subrogation attaches to contract payments that can be identified 
and followed. 
The cases cited by Transport in support of its argument for 
the escrow funds are distinguishable on the case's facts. For 
example, in National Surety Co. v. Salt Lake County, 5 F.2d 34 
(8th Cir. 1925), only one creditor was involved. The National 
Surety case did not address a situation, such as the one in the 
the present case, involving multiple claimants. Neither do the 
cases cited by Transport support Transport's agrument that a 
surety's right of subrogation must be postponed until claims 
outside the class of claims covered by the bond are satisfied. 
The District Court ruled in this case that Transport's claim for 
damages to its equipment was outside the coverage of the bond. 
Moreover, the claim is disputed and unliquidated. Reliance need 
not wait for reimbursement until that claim is paid. 
Authorities relied upon by Transport regarding resort to 
security are not applicable to this case. The escrow money is 
not Transport's security. The money was merely placed in escrow 
pending the resolution of the rental dispute which was 
subsequently resolved by stipulation. Transport could not 
obtain the money without a joint order by Transport and L. A. 
Young or an order by a court. 
Travelers Indemnity Co. v. West Georgia National Bank, 387 
F. Supp. 1090 (1974); United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. 
Sweeney, 80 F.2d 235 (8th Cir. 1935). 
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Further distinguishing the cases cited by Transport is the 
fact that in the present case Reliance fully performed its 
obligations under the performance bond. The fact that 
respondent paid the debts and fulfilled the duties of L. A, 
Young entitled Reliance to retainages as the subrogee of the 
State• Covenant Mutual Insurance Co. v. Able Concrete Pump, 
609 F. Supp. 27 (D. Cal. 1984). In Covenant Mutual, the court 
held that a surety who had completed performance pursuant to its 
performance bond, at a cost greater than the balance owing under 
the contract, was a subrogee of the government and had an 
equitable right to the government's retainages from the 
contractor's progress payment. The court concluded that the 
surety was entitled to these funds even though the payment bond 
did not fully compensate laborers and material suppliers. The 
court held that since the surety had completed performance at a 
cost in excess of the contract price, including retainages, the 
surety was entitled to all of the retained sums. 
In this case, Reliance completed the project at a cost in 
excess of the contract price and, in fact, has expended over 
$1.2 million. Reliance is therefore entitled to progress 
payments and the funds held in escrow which are identifiable as 
progress payments. 
B. Exoneration and Quia Timet Entitle Reliance to Apply 
the Escrow Funds to Transport's Claims 
Reliance's complaint (C87-1984) also sought relief through 
exoneration and quia timet. Exoneration, in the context of a 
bonded construction project, is the surety's right to require 
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that contract proceeds be used to pay contract obligations of 
its principal, which if unpaid, would become the obligation of 
the surety. For exoneration to operate, the surety need not 
make payment. 
This well established principle of suretyship entitles 
Reliance to require the escrow funds to be used to pay the 
bonded obligations of Reliance, and not to be diverted for any 
other purpose. One court has explained this principle as 
follows: 
No principle of equity is more familiar, 
or more firmly established, than that a 
surety, after the debt for which he is 
liable has become due, without paying, 
or being called on to pay it, may file 
a bill in equity to compel the principal 
debtor to exonerate him from liability 
by its payment, provided no rights of the 
creditor are prejudiced thereby. 
Poster v. Continental Casualty Co., 105 So. 2d 83, 85-86 (Ala. 
1958). 
The United States Supreme Court has applied exoneration in 
a construction context. In Martin v. National Surety Co., 300 
U.S. 588 (1937), the contractor gave a subcontractor a power of 
attorney by which the subcontractor obtained from the government 
progress or deferred payments then due upon the contract. When 
the contractor's surety learned of the subcontractor's actions, 
it brought suit in federal court against the contractor and the 
subcontractor and prayed that the monies received by the 
subcontractor be impounded and that the funds be disbursed in 
payment of bills for labor and material in exoneration of the 
surety. 
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The Supreme Court stated that the equities in favor of 
material suppliers, growing out of an indemnity agreement 
between the contractor and the surety and the assignment of 
contract proceeds in that agreement, were impressed upon monies 
collected by the subcontractor. The Supreme Court further noted 
that it was in the interest of the government to give effect to 
the assignment by the contractor to the surety. The Court 
explained: 
The proceeds of the contract, when 
collected by the subcontractor under his 
power of attorney, were received by him 
with the knowledge of the agreement be-
tween the contractor and the surety where-
by such proceeds became a fund to be de-
voted in the first instance to the pay-
ment of material suppliers and others 
similarly situated. 
Martin, 300 U.S. at 593. 
L. A. Young and Reliance have executed an indemnity 
agreement whereby L. A. Young assigned contract proceeds to 
Reliance. See Addendum ffJ.,f Transport has been notified 
through these proceedings of that assignment. The escrow funds 
are therefore impressed with an equity for the payment of 
obligations covered by Reliance's bond. 
Transport also knew that the source of the money deposited 
in the escrow fund was contract payments on the Black Rock 
project. It is a well established rule, followed in Utah, that 
if a creditor knows that the source of the money he receives is 
the contract upon which a surety is liable, the creditor cannot 
apply the money otherwise than in relief of the surety. Geneva 
Pipe Company v. S & H Insurance Compan/, 714 P.2d 648 (1986); 
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Salt Lake City v. OyConnor, supra; Simpson, Suretyship 192 
(1950). Reliance therefore has the right to require Transport 
and L. A. Young to apply the funds in the escrow account to the 
payment of Reliance's bonded obligation. 
Courts have also recognized the principle of quia timet. 
Quia timet is the surety's right to relief when it justifiably 
fears that the contract proceeds may be diverted from contract 
obligations. Whereas a surety's right of exoneration arises 
when its liability is absolute, its right to quia timet relief 
g 
arises when the liability is merely anticipated. 
In Morley Construction Co. v. Maryland Casualty Co., 90 
F.2d 976 (8th Cir. 1937), the court of appeals affirmed a trial 
court decree granting the surety's suit for quia timet. The 
surety had executed a bond in favor of a contractor for a 
construction contract between the contractor and the United 
States. Pursuant to an agreement between the surety and the 
contractor, the contractor was to deposit into a joint account 
monies and estimates received from the United States from the 
construction contract. The contractor then experienced 
financial difficulties. The surety sued to compel the 
application of contract installment payments to claims for labor 
and materials going into the project. The surety alleged that 
unless the funds were impressed with a trust or lien and the 
contractor was restrained from withdrawing or disbursing the 
See generally, Babcock, "An Update—Suits for Exoneration 
and Other Special Relief," 17 Forum 344 (1981); Mann and 
Jennings, "Quia Timet: A Remedy for the Fearful Surety," 20 
Forum 685 (1985). 
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contract payments that had been paid to it, the surety would 
suffer irreparable loss. The court granted the surety relief. 
Another court, in granting exoneration, explained: 
As between the surety and the principal 
there arises without payment by the surety 
and without his having even been sued an 
equity of exoneration. To have subrogation 
a surety must have discharged in full the 
obligation for which he is bound, . . . 
. . . In the case of exoneration he proceeds 
before payment quia timet, and seeks to 
have payment made to the creditor. . . 
Assuredly equity will require to be applied 
to the obligation a fund which by the very 
contract of suretyship stands as security 
for performance. 
Glades County v. Detroit Fidelity and Surety Co., 57 F.2d 449, 
451-452 (5th Cir. 1932) (emphasis added). 
In this case, Transport seeks to use the contract proceeds 
in the escrow account to pay its claim for damage to its 
equipment. The District Court has ruled that that claim is not 
a proper bond claim. The District Court's ruling regarding the 
escrow account prevents diversion of those contract proceeds to 
unbonded obligations and correctly applies them to the proper 
bond claim for rental hours. 
CONCLUSION 
As a matter of law, a surety is not--and should not be— 
liable on a statutory payment bond for a principal's negligence. 
The applicable statute is specific and limits recovery only to 
materials supplied for "performance of the work provided for in 
the contract." "Negligent" and "extraordinary" damages are not 
"work provided for in the contract." Case law, analogy to 
mechanics' lien law and sound public policy all support the 
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Court in affirming that a surety is not liable for the 
negligence or breach of contract of the principal. A surety is 
not a liability, casualty or property insurer; to hold otherwise 
would misconstrue a surety's function and expand its liability 
to the detriment of the construction industry. Even if this 
Court refuses to rule that a principal is not liable for a 
principal's negligence, as a matter of law, Transport still 
cannot recover damages for repairs. 
Furthermore, Reliance is entitled to the escrow funds under 
the principles of subrogation, exoneration, and quia timet. 
The District Court amply examined the facts material to its 
final orders and judgments. No facts material to the resolution 
of this case are in disout'** The District Court properly 
decided the determinate./e issues as a matter of law and set 
forth those properly decided issues in its final order and 
judgment. Under the proper standard of review the final order 
and judgment should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted this 11th day of March, 1988. 
Howell, Fetzer & Hughes 
^J^A^M. 
Paul R. Howell 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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Civil No. C85-8421 
Judge Frank G. Noel 
Defendant Reliance Insurance Company's Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment came on for hearing on December 19, 
1987, at 10:00 a.m. David L. Hughes and Paul R. Howell 
appeared as counsel for defendant Reliance Insurance 
Company, in support of the motion, and Calvin L. Rampton and 
Larry A. Steele appeared as counsel for plaintiffs, in 
opposition thereto. The court heard the arguments of 
000££ 
counsel and has reviewed the file. The court having taken 
defendant Reliance Insurance Companyfs motion for partial 
summary judgment under advisement and being fully advised, 
now orders as follows: 
1. Reliance Insurance Company's motion is granted. 
2. The payment bond does not cover damage to 
equipment caused by any negligence or misuse by L.A. Young 
Sons Construction Company, and Reliance Insurance Company is 
not liable therefor. 
3. The payment bond does not cover damage caused by 
any breach of the contract between plaintiffs and L.A. Young 
Sons Construction Company, and Reliance Insurance Company is 
not liable therefor^7p 
DATED this-i3th day of March, 1987. 
BY THE COURT: 
ATTEST 
H. DIXON HINDLEY 
Cferfc 
Honorable Frank G. poel 
Third District Court Judge 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
TRANSPORT LEASING COMPANY, 
a Montana partnership, and 
TRANSYSTEMS, INC., a 
Montana corporation qualified 




L. A. YOUNG SONS CONSTRUCTION 
COMPANY, a Utah corporation, 
and RELIANCE INSURANCE 
COMPANY, a corporation, 
Defendants. 




TRANSPORT LEASING COMPANY, 
a Montana partnership, and 
TRANSYSTEMS, INC., a Montana 
FINAL ORDER AND JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 85-8421 
Judge Frank G. Noel 
Civil No. C87-1984 
Judge Frank G. Noel 
corporation qualified to do 
business in the State of 
Utah; L. A, YOUNG SONS 
CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, a 
Utah corporation, 
Defendants. 
Reliance Insurance Company ("Reliance") filed a motion 
for partial summary judgment dated May 12, 1987. Plaintiffs 
filed a motion for summary judgment dated August 13, 1987. The 
pre-trial conference was held August 31, 1987 at 8:00 a.m. In 
attendance at the pre-trial conference were David L. Hughes and 
Paul R. Howell representing Reliance. Calvin L. Rampton and 
Larry A. Steele appeared as counsel for plaintiffs and John 
Preston Creer appeared as counsel for L. A. Young Sons 
Construction Company. 
The court previously having heard the arguments of 
counsel concerning Reliance's motion and plaintiff's motion, 
and having reviewed the file, the court hereby FINDS and ORDERS: 
1. Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment is 
granted. The amount of plaintiff's judgment is $53,423.37, 
plus prejudgment interest in the amount of $7,183.84. The 
amount of prejudgment interest is based upon the interest 
generated by the sum of $53,423.37 held in the escrow account 
through the date of August 31, 1987. Post judgment interest is 
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limited to the amount of interest generated by the sum of 
$60,607.21 plus interest as compounded by the escrow and as 
long as funds are held in the escrow account. 
2. Reliance's motion for partial summary judgment is 
granted. Reliance is entitled to all of the funds in the 
escrow account based upon its rights of subrogation to contract 
proceeds. 
3. The funds are to remain in escrow pending further 
order of the court. 
4. Attorney for L. A. Young represented that because 
of amounts owed to Plaintiffs for rent or other sums owed to 
Reliance and because L. A. Young is in a process of 
liquidation, L. A. Young had no practical interest in appearing 
and defending at the scheduled trial. L. A. Young acknowledged 
that no matter which party prevailed, Reliance or Plaintiffs 
would be entitled to any funds obtained. All issues between 
plaintiffs and Reliance have been decided by summary judgment. 
Counsel for Reliance further indicated that Reliance is not 
obligated to and will not defend L.A. Young. Plaintiffs 
represented that there was no practical reason for Plaintiffs 
to try the case unless and until the court's prior rulings are 
reversed on appeal. Pursuant to Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure, this court finds that although all prior 
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orders and judgments do not resolve all legal claims of all 
parties in this litigation, there is no practical or just 
reason for delay in entering all orders and judgments as 
final. Accordingly, this order and all prior orders are 
expressly entered as final and appealable. 
5. A stay of execution of judgment is in place as to 
plaintiff's judgment against Reliance and also upon Reliance's 
judgment on the escrow funds until further order of the court. 
6. The trial setting which is scheduled for 
September 21, 1987 through October 2, 1987 is vacated pending 
further request for trial setting. 
DATED this /*r day of September, 1987. 
[onorable Frank 0. Noel Honor G  ' ; KS> \ 
District Court Judge 
Approved as to form: 
Da xl— 
^ -4>afid L. Hughes T/ 
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Attorneys for L. /A. Young So 
Construction Company ns 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this the ^ ZlZZTctay of 
September, 1987, I caused to be hand-delivered, a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing Final Order and Judgment, to the 
following parties of record: 
Paul R. Howell 
Clark B. Fetzer 
David L. Hughes 
Howell, Fetzer & Hughes 
700 Continental Bank Building 
200 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
John Preston Creer 
1200 Beneficial Life Tower 
36 South State Street 




Utah Code Ann. 63-56-38. (Supp 1986) 
63-56-38. Bonds necessary when contract is awarded. 
(1) When a construction contract is awarded, the 
following bonds or security shall be delivered to the state 
and shall become binding on the parties upon the execution 
of the contract: 
(a) a performance bond satisfactory to the state, 
in an amount equal to 100% of the price specified 
in the contract, executed by a surety company 
authorized to do business in this state or any 
other form satisfactory to the state; and 
(b) a payment bond satisfactory to the state, in 
an amount equal to 100% of the price specified in 
the contract, executed by a surety company 
authorized to do business in this state or any 
other form satisfactory to the state, for the 
protection of all persons supplying labor and 
material to the contractor or its subcontractors 
for the performance of the work provided for in 
the contract. 
(2) Rules may provide for waiver of the requirement of 
a performance or payment bond where a bond is deemed 
unnecessary for the protection of the state. 
(3) Any person who has furnished labor or material to 
the contractor or subcontractor for the work provided in the 
contract, in respect of which a payment bond is furnished 
under this section, who has not been paid in full within 90 
days from the date on which the last of the labor was 
performed or material was supplied by the person for whom 
the claim is made, may sue on the payment bond for any 
amount unpaid at the time the suit is instituted and may 
prosecute the action for the amount due the person. Any 
person having a contract with a subcontractor of the 
contractor, but no express or implied contract with the 
contractor furnishing the payment bond, has a right of 
action upon the payment bond upon giving written notice to 
the contractor and surety company within 90 days from the 
date on which the last of the labor was performed or 
material was supplied by the person for whom the claim is 
made. The person shall state in the notice the amount 
claimed and the name of the party for whom the labor was 
performed or to whom the material was supplied. The notice 
shall be served by registered or certified mail, postage 
prepaid, on the contractor and surety company at any place 
the contractor or surety company maintains an office or 
conducts business. 
(4) Any suit instituted upon a payment bond shall be 
brought in the district court of the county in which the 
construction contract was to be performed. No suit may be 
commenced by a claimant under this section more than 180 
days after a surety finally denies that claimant's claim. 
The obligee named in the bond need not be joined as a party 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY/ STATE OF UTAH 
TRANSPORT LEASING COMPANY/ 
a Montana partnership/ and 
TRANSYSTEMS, INC., a Montana 
corporation qualified to do 
business in the State of Utah/ 
Plaintiffs/ 
vs. 
L. A. YOUNG SONS CONSTRUCTION 
COMPANY/ a Utah corporation/ 




Ctivil No C 858421 
COME NOW the Plaintiffs above named and for cause of 
action against the above-named Defendants complain and allege 
as follows: 
1. The Plaintiff Transystems, Inc. is a Montana 
corporation with its principal place of business at Helena, 
Montana, and is qualified to do business in the State of 
Utah. The Plaintiff Transport Leasing is a Montana 
oooco' 
partnership doing business in the State of Utah- Both of the 
Plaintiffs are the owners of various types of heavy transport 
vehicles and are engaged in the business of leasing said 
vehicles and also in the business of hauling commodities and 
materials of various kinds. 
2. L. A. Young Sons Construction Company is a Utah 
corporation having its principal place of business in 
Richfield/ Utah/ and is engaged in the business of 
contracting for the construction of roads. 
3. The Defendant Reliance Insurance Company is a 
bonding and insurance company qualified to do business in the 
State of Utah and doing business in the State of Utah writing 
and issuing construction bonds. 
4. On or about the 24th day of May, 1985/ the 
Plaintiffs entered into a leasing agreement with the 
Defendant L. A. Young Sons Construction Company/ a copy of 
which agreement is marked Exhibit "A", attached hereto/ and 
by this reference made a part hereof. Under the terms of 
such agreement/ the services to be performed thereunder were 
to be performed in Salt Lake County/ State of Utah. This 
court is the proper venue in which to bring this action. 
5. On or about the 21st day of June, 1985, the 
parties to Exhibit "A" entered into an addendum to such 
agreement, a copy of which addendum is marked Exhibit "B" and 
hereto attached and by this reference made a part hereof. 
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6. Plaintiffs made the tractor and trailer units 
called for in Exhibits "A" and "B" available on the 
construction site. Part of the vehicles were made available 
on May 28/ 1985/ and the balance of said vehicles was made 
available shortly thereafter/ all within the provisions of 
Exhibits "A" and "B" attached hereto. Such tractor and 
trailer units remained continuously on the job and available 
to the Defendant L. A. Young Sons Construction Company at all 
times to and including September 6/ 1985. 
7. During the course of the performance of the 
leasing agreement/ disputes arose between the parties/ both 
as to the number of hours of tractor and trailer time for 
which the Defendant L. A. Young Sons Construction should be 
billed and as to the amount of repairs to such tractor and 
trailer units which were caused by the negligence or 
intentional wrongdoing of L. A. Young Sons Construction 
Company and thus the responsibility of L. A. Young Sons 
Construction Company. An agreement was reached between the 
parties to the effect that undisputed amounts of billings 
made by Plaintiffs to L. A. Young Sons Construction Company 
should be paid to the Plaintiffs and that disputed amounts 
should be paid into an escrow account at the Continental Bank 
& Trust Company in Salt Lake City/ Utah. Attached hereto as 
Exhibit "C" and by this reference made a part hereof is a 
letter agreement dated August 13/ 1985/ regarding the 
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establishment of the escrow account. Attached hereto as 
Exhibit "D" and by this reference made a part hereof is the 
escrow agreement with Continental Bank & Trust Company 
executed by the parties hereto and approved by Continental 
Bank & Trust Company. 
8. The net amount in the escrow account at 
Continental Bank including all payments made into such 
account less authorized disbursements plus earnings 
accumulated as of November 30/ 1985/ was approximately 
$61/214.13. Such amount will continue to accrue earnings 
until disbursed by the Bank pursuant to the agreement of the 
parties or the order of a court of competent jurisdiction. 
9. Notwithstanding the provisions of Exhibit "CM and 
in breach of such provisions/ the Defendant L. A. Young Sons 
Construction Company has refused to place in escrow certain 
amounts arising from disputed billings from the Plaintiffs/ 
and there are therefore amounts due and owing to the 
Plaintiffs by the Defendants over and above the amount in 
such escrow accounts. 
10. Under the provisions of Paragraph 4 of Exhibit 
"A"/ the Defendants are required to maintain the roads over 
which the leased vehicles are to be operated in a suitable 
condition so that unreasonable or excessive wear and tear to 
the leased units shall not ensue. Under said paragraph the 
Defendants are further charged with the responsibility of 
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repairing any damage to the leased vehicles resulting from 
negligence of the Lessee or Lessee's employees. The 
Defendant L. A. Young Sons Construction Company failed to 
keep the roadways over which the equipment operated in a 
suitable condition to avoid unreasonable or excessive wear 
and tear to the leased units and also through the negligence 
of the employees of said L. A. Young Sons Construction 
Company or through the wilful misconduct of said employees 
inflicted damages on said leased units in the amount of 
$149/855.61- Such damage resulted from the breach of the 
provisions of Paragraph 4, Exhibit "A"/ and the Plaintiffs 
are entitled to be paid such amount and have submitted to the 
Defendants itemized billings thereon. A portion of such 
amount has been paid into escrow and the balance/ in 
violation of the provisions of Exhibit "C"/ has not been paid 
either to the Plaintiffs or into escrow. 
11. Paragraph 5(b) of Exhibit "A" provides for the 
amounts to be paid by the Defendants to the Plaintiffs for 
the lease of tractor and trailer units. The Defendants have 
paid a portion of the billings made under Paragraph 5(b) of 
Exhibit "A"/ and have paid some of the billings into the 
escrow and have refused to pay other billings at all in 
violation of the provisions of Exhibit "C". The amount due 
and owing to the Plaintiffs from the Defendants under the 
provisions of Paragraph 5(b) of Exhibit "A" is $53/276.00. 
ooooo1 
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Full and complete accountings of such amounts have been 
furnished by the Plaintiffs to the Defendants. 
12. The Defendant Reliance Insurance Company 
executed a bond running to the owners of the road project 
guaranteeing the payment by the contractor of all valid 
claims of subcontracters/ material suppliers/ and laborers 
under such contract. The claims of the Plaintiffs hereto is 
within the guarantee of such bond. Such bondsman is indebted 
to the Plaintiffs for the amount of the claims against L. A. 
Young Sons Construction Company. 
13. Plaintiff is entitled to interest on the claims 
above described from the time the same became due as 
evidenced by various billings until paid. As a result of the 
wilful failure of the Defendant to make payment of said 
claims, the Plaintiff is entitled to recover a reasonable 
attorneys1 fee for bringing this action. 
WHEREFORE, the Plaintiffs pray judgment against the 
Defendants as follows: 
(a) For the sum of $203,131.61, amounts justly due 
and owing by the Defendants to the Plaintiffs for amounts 
payable under the provisions of Exhibit "A" plus interest on 
such amount at the legal rate from the dates of various 
billings until paid. 
(b) For a reasonable attorneys1 fee to be paid to 
the Plaintiffs1 attorney and for other allowable costs and 
ooooo 
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expenses incurred in the bringing of this action. 
(c) Directing and authorizing Continental Bank & 
Trust Company to pay to the Plaintiffs the amounts contained 
in the escrow account described in Paragraph 5 above/ 
together with all interest accrued in such account to the 
date of such payment/ such payment to apply on the judgment 
awarded under (a) and (b) above. 
DATED this [3—'day of December/ 1985. 
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH 
By 
CSTvin L. Ramptb 





THIS AGREEMENT is entered into this C>^A day of 
May, 1985, by and between L. A. Young Sons Construction 
Company, a Utah corporation (hereinafter called the 
"Lessee"), and Transport Leasing Company, a Montana 
partnership, and Transystems, Inc., a Montana Corporation 
qualified to do business in the state of Utah, (hereinafter 
called the "Lessor"). 
W I T N E S S T H 
WHEREAS, the Lessee has entered into a contract with 
the Department of Transportation of the State of Utah to 
perform certain construction work on a road project in Salt 
Lake County, State of Utah, designated as the Black Rock to 
Old Saltaire Road, No. IR-80-3 (95) 102, and 
WHEREAS, the Lessee desires to lease from the Lessor 
certain equipment as hereinafter described for the purpose of 
performing such contract, and 
WHEREAS, the Lessee is indebted to the Lessor on two 
prior contracts designated as the Burmester Interchange 
Project and the Millard County Road Project in the sum of 
$132,277.79, a portion of which has been reduced to judgment 
in the Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, in a case designated as C84-7447, and 
WHEREAS, Reliance Insurance Company, a corporation 
qualified to do business in the State of Utah (hereinafter 
called the "Bonding Company") executed the bond covering the 
Burmester Project and the Millard County Road Project and is 
also issuing a bond to the State of Utah covering the Black 
Rock to Old Saltaire Road contract; and 
WHEREAS, the Bonding Company, in consideration of 
the agreements hereinafter entered into by the Lessor, has 
furnished the Lessor with a separate letter agreement by 
which the Bonding Company agrees that the provisions of this 
contract will in no way affect the liability of the Bonding 
Company in regard to the Burmester Interchange Project and 
the Millard County Road Project, 
NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the mutual 
agreements hereinafter set forth, it is agreed between the 
parties as follows: 
1. The Lessor shall lease to the Lessee and the 
Lessee shall lease from the Lessor for use in the performance 
of the contract with the Utah Department of Transportation 
mentioned above eight (8) tractor and trailer units for the 
handling and hauling of sand, gravel, fill material and other 
similar substances, each unit to have a capacity of 50 tons. 
The lease shall be for a period of at least 60 working days, 
to commence on the £7<c5 day of 7 / / & ^ 3 f ^ ^ t 1985. 
2. The Lessor shall furnish the said equipment in 
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in good condition and during the terms of the lease will 
provide maintenance, except as hereinafter provided, 
licensing, insurance, permits, and shall provide, in 
addition, two full time supervisors to supervise the Lessor's 
obligations under the lease. 
3. The Lessee shall furnish and pay for all fuel 
and fuel taxes, all labor, including all tax and fringe 
benefits, and all services required in the loading, weighing, 
and unloading of such trucks. 
4. In the event any of the leased equipment shall 
be damaged through the negligence of the Lessee or the 
Lessee's employees, the Lessee shall be responsible for the 
repair of such damage. The Lessee shall have the 
responsibility of maintaining the roads over which the leased 
equipment will be operated in a suitable condition so that 
unreasonable or excessive wear and tear to the leased units 
shall not result from the operation. 
5. Payment shall be made from the Lessee to the 
Lessor as follows: 
a. $41,250 as a mobilization charge which shall be 
payable out of the first payment made by the 
Department of Transportation of the State of 
Utah on estimated work performed. 
b. Payments for the lease of the equipment, in 
addition to the mobilization charge set forth 
. 3 . ooo 
above, shall be $35 per hour for each hauling 
unit for a minimum of 16 hours a day for a 
minimum of 60 working days. If the average 
usage of all eight units shall exceed 18 hours 
per day in any one day, all hours over 18 hours 
per day shall be $32.75 per hour. Hours of use 
will include all hours including time spent 
waiting to load and unload? but^_will exclude 
hours- that a unit may be down, fior mechanical 
failure. 
6, All checks issued by the State of Utah, 
Department of Transportation, for the performance of the work 
under the contract described above shall be issued jointly to 
the Lessor and the Lessee. 
7. From the proceeds of the Lessee's earnings on 
this contract, in addition to amounts provided for in 
Paragraph 5 above, the lessee shall pay to the Lessor the sum 
of $132,277.79 plus interest from May 10, 1985, on the unpaid 
balance at the rate of twelve percent per annum. Such amount 
shall be payable in equal amounts over the first ten weeks of 
this contract. If the contract shall run the minimum of 60 
days but less than ten weeks, the total balance remaining 
unpaid of said $132,277.79 shall be paid from the proceeds of 
the final week. 
-A- GOOG^Z 
8. So long as this contract shall remain in good 
standing, the Lessor agrees not to issue execution on the 
judgment already entered in the Third Judicial District Court 
in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, in Civil No. 
C84-7447 and agrees not to obtain judgment against the 
Bonding Company. Upon the payment of the amount provided in 
Paragraph 7 above in full, Lessor agrees to dismiss said 
action as to all parties. In the event Lessee does not 
fulfill the terms of Paragraph 7 above, the Lessor may 
immediately proceed with execution in Case No. C84-7447 and 
may proceed to seek judgment in that case against the Bonding 
Company. 
9. In the event it is necessary for any party to 
this agreement to bring legal action to enforce its rights 
thereunder, the prevailing party in such legal action shall 
be entitled to recover all of its costs of litigation 
including a reasonable attorneys' fee. 
SIGNED the day and date first above written. 
L. A/'YOUNG SONS CONSTRUCTION 
"LESSOR"! ^—^ 
Its P r e s i d e n t 7 y t s 
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ADDENDUM TO LEASING AGREEMENT 
WHEREAS, L. A- Young Sons Construction Company, a 
Utah corporation (hereinafter called the "Lessee"), and 
Transport Leasing Company, a Montana partnership, and 
Transystems, Inc.,,%a Montana corporation qualified to do 
business in the state of Utah, (hereinafter called the 
"Lessor"), entered into a Leasing Agreement for certain 
tractor and trailer units, said Leasing Agreement being dated 
the 24th day of May, 1985, and 
WHEREAS, all of the units provided for in such 
Leasing Agreement were not available as of May 28, 1985, the 
3tart-up date of said Leasing Agreement, and 
WHEREAS, all of the units will be available as of 
June 10, 1985, and 
WHEREAS, the parties have agreed on the charge to be 
made for the units that were available between May 28, 1985, 
and June 10, 1985, 
NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the mutual 
agreements hereinafter set forth, it is agreed between the 
parties that the following changes shall be made in the 
contract entered into on the 24th day of May, 1985: 
1. The date on which the minimum lease period of 60 
working days shall commence as provided in Paragraph 1 of said 
agreement shall be June 10, 1985, rather than May 28, 1985. 
2. Compensation payable by the Lessee to the Lessor 
for the period between May 28, 1985, and June 10, 1985, shall 
be as follows: 
Week Beginning May 28, 1985 
230 Unit Hours x $35 
Week Beginning June 3, 1985 
372.5 Unit Hours x $35 
Total 
3. All other provisions of the leasing agreement 
shall continue unchanged. 




L. A. YOUNG SONS CONSTRUCTION 
"LESSOR, 
/ / . 
By KJ^L, "^ 
ts President 
TRANSPORT LEASING COMPANY 
"LESSEE" 
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August 1 3 , 1985 
SALT LAKE CITY O T I C E 
SOO FIRST INTERSTATE PLAZ4 
170 SOUTH MAIN STREET 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 6-4IOI 
TELEPHONE (aOl) 521-3200 
TELEX 3 2 4 8 9 8 
TELEX 531-1700 
WASHINGTON, O.C. QTriCE 
SUITE 3 5 0 
IOOI 2222 STREET, N.W. 
WASHINGTON, O.C. 20037 
TELEPHONE (202) 2 0 8 - 5 9 5 0 
TELECOPIER (202) 2 9 3 - 2 5 0 9 
RESTON OrriCE 
I8IO MICHAEL FARAOAY ROAO 
SUITE 102 
RESTON, VIRGINIA 2 2 0 9 0 
TELEPHONE (703) 437-8242 
ST. GEORGE Qrf lCE 
ONE SOUTH MAIN STREET 
ST. GEORGE, UTAH 84770 
TELEPHONE (80l) 828-1827 
IN REPLY REFER TO: 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
John Preston Creer 
1200 Beneficial Life Tower 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Dear Mr. Creer: 
I am writing this letter to you in regard to the bill sub-
mitted by Transysterns, Inc. to L. A. Young & Sons Construction 
Company covering the period from June 24th, 1985 to July 18th, 
1985. The entire bill is for $145,388.36 made up of the follow-
ing items: 
To apply on Judgment 
Interest on Judgment 
1,766.5 hours truck time at 
$35 per hour 
308 hours truck time at 
$32 per hour 






You contest all of the charges for damages to the trucks 
and $32,440.84 of the total of $71,683.50 truck charges. You 
contest the truck rental charges on the ground that part of the 
charge was applicable to hours not worked but for which we claim 
0 OOGX? 
John Preston Creer 
August 13, 1985 
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a minimum charge was applicable. 
It is our agreement that the entire check for $145,953.95 
shall be deposited in escrow with The Continental Bank and Trust 
Company. The Continental Bank shall thereupon make Transystems, 
Inc. a check for $93,824.00 to cover the uncontested part of the 
bill and deliver such check to us. This uncontested amount 
includes: 
Old Judgment $ 52,911.12 
Interest on Old Judgment 1,104.63 
875 hours double trucks at $35 
per hour 30,625.00 
287 hours single trucks at $32 
per hour 9,184.00 
The balance of $52,129.95 shall be held subject to the provisions 
of the escrow agreement. 
In regard to future billings, Transystems, Inc. will send 
to L. A. Young Construction Company two bills, one covering amounts 
applicable to the existing Judgment with interest thereon plus 
the charge for hours worked under the current contract, the 
other bill will cover any hours not worked, but which Transystems, 
Inc. maintains are chargeable under the provisions of the con-
tract plus any claims for damages of the trucks. If either bill 
is contested by L. A. Young Construction Company, an attempt 
will be made to adjust the differences by negotiation after such 
negotiation is approved the first billing will be sent to the 
Utah Department of Transportation for immediate payment. If 
L. A. Young Construction Company contests the charges in the 
second billing, an attempt will be made through negotiation, 
and the agreed bill sent to the Utah Department of Transportation 
for payment. If negotiation is not successful, then the second bill 
together with any disputed amounts on the first billing will be 
forwarded to the Utah Department of Transportation and the amounts 
of such consolidated, but contested billing, will be paid into 
oooc 
John Preston Creer 
August 13, 1985 
Page 3 
the escrow account at The Continental Bank subject to the pro-
visions of the existing escrow agreement. 
If you are in agreement with these provisions, please 
indicate by signing below. 
Sincerely, 
EXHIBIT "D" 
ESCROW AGREEMENT AND INSTRUCTIONS 
TO: The Continental Bank & Trust Company 
200 South Main 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
IT IS AGREED by and between TRANSYSTEMS, INC., (Fed. 
I.D. #810240143) hereinafter called "Transystems", and L. A. 
YOUNG SONS CONSTRUCTION, (Fed. I.D. #870200278) hereinafter 
called "Young", that they will deposit certain funds with the 
Continental Bank & Trust Company, hereinafter called "Agent", 
to be held, invested, managed and disbursed in accordance with 
the terms, conditions and provisions of this agreement and 
instructions as follows: 
1. Transystems and Young have endorsed a draft 
issued by the State of Utah and made payable to Transystems and 
Young jointly and in the amount of fel45,388.36. Transystems 
and Young herewith deliver and deposit to Agent said check to 
be held, managed, invested and disbursed in accordance with the 
terms, conditions and directions contained in this agreement 
and set of instructions. 
2. Upon receipt of the draft and upon receipt of the 
actual funds represented by the draft referred to in 
paragraph 1 above, Agent is authorized to make disbursement 
from the sum deposited with Agent only to Transystems, Inc. in 
the amount of Ninety-Three Thousand Eight Hundred Twenty-Four 
Dollars ($93,824). 
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3. Money received by Agent in this escrow which is 
not disbursed under the provisions of paragraph 2 above shall 
be deposited in Agent's bank in an interest-bearing 
Shearson-American T-fund or an equivalent interest-bearing fund 
or account* Agent shall have no duty or responsibility to 
invest any of the balance of the funds in securities or other 
property* The Agent shall have full power to manage# control 
and in all respects deal with all of the funds constituting 
this escrow, and shall collect any interest that may be payable 
thereon and add such interest to the said funds, to be held, 
administered and managed as a part thereof until such time as 
the provisions of this agreement and these instructions allow 
Agent to disburse said funds* 
4. The Agent shall be authorized to deliver or 
disburse the balance of the funds not paid out in accordance 
with the provisions of paragraph 2 above upon, and only upon, 
either of the following two conditions: 
a* In accordance with written instructions 
signed by both Transystems and Young or authorized 
officers of the same. 
b. Pursuant to the provisions of a valid court 
order. 
5. The undersigned parties, Transystems and Young, 
agree to pay to agent $250 management fee for each year or a 
-2-
00002 
part of any given year in advance plus a fee for any 
extraordinary services or activity performed by Agent. All 
fees may be deducted from held funds by Agent. Transystems and 
Young shall each be liable for one-half of all said fees. 
i \ 
6. All notices, demands, or declaration of any kind 
are to be given by any party to any other party, it shall be in 
writing, signed by the party giving it or its attorney, 
directed to the other party and mailed as follows: 
Transystems, Inc. 
c/o Calvin Rampton 
1500 First Interstate Plaza 
170 South Main 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
L.A. Young Sons Construction 
c/o John Preston Creer 
1200 Beneficial Life Tower 
36 South State 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
The Continental Bank & Trust Company 
200 South Main 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
7. The provisions on the reverse of the standard 
Escrow Contract of Agent are incorporated herein by reference 
and attached hereto. i 




DATED this /^) day of August, 198 5. 
L. A. YOUNG SONS CONSTRUCTION 
APPROVAL OF INSTRUCTIONS 
I have read the above agreement and set of 
instructions submitted by Transystems and Young and approve the 
same. 
DATED this day of August, 1985. 
CONTINENTAL BANK & TRUST COMPANY 








The Continental Bank and Trust Company 
200 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Gentlemen: 
The undersigned, (Seller) 
hereinafter called "Grantor", whose address is 
and (Buyer) 
hereinafter called "Grantee", whose address is 
herewith deliver to you in escrow, the documents and property hereinafter described, to be held and dis-
posed of by you in accordance with the following instructions and upon the terms and conditions herein-
after set forth, to which the undersigned hereby agree. 
PAPERS, INSTRUMENTS, MONEY and/or PROPERTY DEPOSITED: 
YOUR INSTRUCTIONS ARE AS FOLLOWS: 
You are hereby authorized and directed to deliver the above described documents and property to 
Grantee upon payment to you, at your above address, for the Grantor of the total sum of $ , 
principal, ($ having already been paid by the Grantee to the Grantor on an original prin-
cipal amount of $ ) and interest on the unpaid balance thereof at per cent per 
annum from ,19 , to be paid as follows: 
The undersigned hereby agree as follows: 
1. The Continental Bank and Trust Company (hereinafter called the "bank"), is not a party, or 




 ur*' ;- he- Sy authorized to receive any or ail such payments or any part thereof at any 
time after the dates herein specified therefor and prior to receipt of notice of default delivered to the 
bank in writing by Grantor. 
3. The bank acts hereunder as a depositary only, and is not responsible or liable in any manner 
whatever for the sufficiency, correctness, genuineness or validity of any instrument deposited with it 
hereunder, or with respect to the form or execution of the same, or the identity, authority, or rights of 
any person executing or depositing the same. / w w m o / i 
4. The bank shall not be required to take or be bound by notice of any default of any personvW^»^l^4 
to take any action with respect to such default involving any expense or Inability, unless notice in writing 
is given an officer of the bank of such default by the undersigned or any of them, and unless it is indem-
nified in a manner satisfactory to it against any such expense or liability. 
5. The bank shall be protected in acting upon any notice, request, waiver, consent, receipt or other 
paper or document believed by the bank to be genuine and tc be signed by the proper party or parties. 
6. The bank shall not be liable for any error of judgment or for any act done or step taken or 
omitted by it in good faith, or for any mistake of fact or law, or for anything which it may do or refrain 
from doing in connection herewith, except its own wilful misconduct. 
7. The bank shall not be answerable for the default or misconduct of any agent, attorney or em-
ployee appointed by it if such agent or employee shall have been selected with reasonable care. 
8. The bank may advise with legal counsel in the event of any dispute or question as to the con-
struction of the foregoing instructions, or the bank's duties thereunder and the bank shall incur no liabili-
ty and shall be fully protected in acting in accordance with the opinion and instructions of such counsel. 
9. The bank shall have a first lien on the property and papers held by it hereunder, for its com-
pensation and for any costs, liability, expense or counsel fees it may incur. 
10. In the event of any disagreement between the undersigned or any of them, and/or the person 
or persons named in the foregoing instruction, and/or any other person, resulting in adverse claims and de-
mands being made in connection with or for any papers, money or property involved herein or affected 
hereby, the bank shall be entitled at its option to refuse to comply with any such claim or demand, so 
long as such disagreement shall continue, and in so refusing the bank may make no delivery or other dis-
position of any money, papers or property involved herein or affected hereby and in so doing the bank shall 
not be or become liable to the undersigned or any of them or to any person named in the foregoing in-
structions for its failure or refusal to comply with such conflicting or adverse demands; and the bank 
shall be entitled to continue so to refrain and refuse so to act until: 
(1) The rights of the adverse claimants have been finally adjudicated in a court assuming 
and having jurisdiction of the parties and the money, papers and property involved here-
in or affected hereby; and/or 
(2) All differences shall have been adjusted by agreement and the bank shall have been no-
tified thereof in writing signed by all of the persons interested. 
11. No assignment or transfer of this escrow agreement or of any documents or property, includ-
ing money, held in this escrow or of any interest therein can be made, but said documents and property 
may be withdrawn and this escrow agreement terminated by mutual consent. 
12. The undersigned agree to pay to the bank the sum of $ as an acceptance 
fee with respect to its sen-ices hereunder for one year from the date hereof and further hereby agree to 
pay the Hank an additional fee of one-tenth of one per cent of all funds received hereunder, provided how-
ever, that a minimum fee of $ shall be charged for each payment received. It is also 
agreed that additional compensation shall also be paid to the bank for any additional or extraordinary ser-
vices it may be required to render hereunder. Should any money, document or property remain in escrow 
after one year from date hereof, the undersigned hereby agree to pay the bank the sum of $ 
for each year or fraction of year that such money, document or property is held by the bank hereunder; 
and in the event such annual charge remains unpaid for a period of one year, the bank shall have the 
right and is hereby authorized and directed to close its records with respect hereto and destroy any docu-
ments held by it hereunder. 
GRANTOR GRANTEE 
The Continental Bank and Trust Company hereby acknowledges receipt of the letter of instructions 
of which the foregoing is a copy and of the papers, money or property therein referred to and agrees to 
hold and dispose of the same in accordance with said instructions and upon the terms and conditions 
above set forth. 
THE CONTINENTAL BANK AND TRUST COMPANY 
Date: 19 
Trust Officer 
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THIS AGREEMENT is entered into this day of 
May, 1985, by and between L. A. Young Sons Construction 
Company, a Utah corporation (hereinafter called the 
"Lessee"), and Transport Leasing Company, a Montana 
partnership, and Transystems, Inc., a Montana Corporation 
qualified to do business in the state of Utah, (hereinafter 
called the "Lessor")• 
W I T N E S S T H 
WHEREAS, the Lessee has entered into a contract with 
the Department of Transportation of the State of Utah to 
perform certain construction work on a road project in Salt 
Lake County, State of Utah, designated as the Black Rock to 
Old Saltaire Road, No. IR-80-3 (95) 102, and 
WHEREAS, the Lessee desires to lease from the Lessor 
certain equipment as hereinafter described for the purpose of 
performing such contract, and 
WHEREAS, the Lessee is indebted to the Lessor on two 
prior contracts designated as the Burmester Interchange 
Project and the Millard County Road Project in the sum of 
$132,277.79, a portion of which has been reduced to judgment 
in the Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, in a case designated as C84-7447, and 
WHEREAS, Reliance Insurance Company, a corporation 
qualified to do business in the State of Utah (hereinafter 
called the "Bonding Company11) executed the bond covering the 
Burmester Project and the Millard County Road Project and is 
also issuing a bond to the State of Utah covering the Black 
Rock to Old Saltaire Road contract; and 
WHEREAS, the Bonding Company, in consideration of 
the agreements hereinafter entered into by the Lessor, has 
furnished the Lessor with a separate letter agreement by 
which the Bonding Company agrees that the provisions of this 
contract will in no way affect the liability of the Bonding 
Company in regard to the Burmester Interchange Project and 
the Millard County Road Project, 
NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the mutual 
agreements hereinafter set forth, it is agreed between the 
parties as follows: 
1. The Lessor shall lease to the Lessee and the 
Lessee shall lease from the Lessor for use in the performance 
of the contract with the Utah Department of Transportation 
mentioned above eight (8) tractor and trailer units for the 
handling and hauling of sand* gravel, fill material and other 
similar substances, each unit to have a capacity of 50 tons. 
The lease shall be for a period of at least 60 working days, 
to commence on the ^ ^ 3 day of / ^ / ^ ^ ^ ^ , 1985. 
2* The Lessor shall furnish the said equipment in 
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in good condition and during the terms of the lease will 
provide maintenance, except as hereinafter provided, 
licensing, insurance, permits, and shall provide, in 
addition, two full time supervisors to supervise the Lessor's 
obligations under the lease. 
3. The Lessee shall furnish and pay for all fuel 
and fuel taxes, all labor, including all tax and fringe 
benefits, and all services required in the loading, weighing, 
and unloading of such trucks. 
4. In the event any of the leasted equipment shall 
be damaged through the negligence of the Lessee or the 
Lessee's employees, the Lessee shall be responsible for the 
repair of such damage. The Lessee shall have the 
responsibility of maintaining the roads over which the leased 
equipment will be operated in a suitable condition so that 
unreasonable or excessive wear and tear to the leased units 
shall not result from the operation. 
5. Payment shall be made from the Lessee to the 
Lessor as follows: 
a. $41,250 as a mobilization charge which shall be 
payable out of the first payment made by the 
Department of Transportation of the State of 
Utah on estimated work performed. 
b. Payments for the lease of the equipment, in 
addition to the mobilization charge set forth 
-3-
above, shall be $35 per hour for each hauling 
unit for a minimum of 16 hours a day for a 
minimum of 60 working days. If the average 
usage of all eight units shall exceed 18 hours 
per day in any one day, all hours over 18 hours 
per day shall be $32.75 per hour. Hours of use 
will include all hours including time spent 
waiting to load and unload, but will exclude 
hours- that a unit may be down.fior mechanical 
failure. 
6. All checks issued by the State of Utah, 
Department of Transportation, for the performance of the work 
under the contract described above shall be issued jointly to 
the Lessor and the Lessee. 
7. From the proceeds of the Lessee's earnings on 
this contract, in addition to amounts provided for in 
Paragraph 5 above, the lessee shall pay to the Lessor the sum 
of $132,277.79 plus interest from May 10, 1985, on the unpaid 
balance at the rate of twelve percent per annum. Such amount 
shall be payable in equal amounts over the first ten weeks of 
this contract. If the contract shall run the minimum of 60 
days but less than ten weeks, the total balance remaining 
unpaid of said $132,277.79 shall be paid from the proceeds of 
the final week. 
-4-
8. So long as this contract shall remain in good 
standing, the Lessor agrees not to issue execution on the 
judgment already entered in the Third Judicial District Court 
in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, in Civil No, 
C84-7447 and agrees not to obtain judgment against the 
Bonding Company. Upon the payment of the amount provided in 
Paragraph 7 above in full, Lessor agrees to dismiss said 
action as to all parties. In the event Lessee does not 
fulfill the terms of Paragraph 7 above, the Lessor may 
immediately proceed with execution in Case No. C84-7447 and 
may proceed to seek judgment in that case against the Bonding 
Company. 
9. In the event it is necessary for any party to 
this agreement to bring legal action to enforce its rights 
thereunder, the prevailing party in such legal action shall 
be entitled to recover all of its costs of litigation 
including a reasonable attorneys' fee. 
SIGNED the day and date first above written. 
-5-






•resident / C 
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EXHIBIT "B" 
ADDENDUM TO LEASING AGREEMENT 
WHEREAS, L. A. Young Sons Construction Company, a 
Utah corporation (hereinafter called the "Lessee11), and 
Transport Leasing Company, a Montana partnership, and 
Transystems, Inc.,, a Montana corporation qualified to do 
business in the state of Utah, (hereinafter called the 
"Lessor"), entered into a Leasing Agreement for certain 
tractor and trailer units, said Leasing Agreement being dated 
the 24th day of May, 1985, and 
WHEREAS, all of the units provided for in such 
Leasing Agreement were not available as of May 28, 1985, the 
start-up date of said Leasing Agreement, and 
WHEREAS, all of the units will be available as of 
June 10, 1985, and 
WHEREAS, the parties have agreed on the charge to be 
made for the units that were available between May 28, 1985, 
and June 10, 1985, 
NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the mutual 
agreements hereinafter set forth, it is agreed between the 
parties that the following changes shall be made in the 
contract entered into on the 24th day of May, 1985: 
1. The date on which the minimum lease period of 60 
working days shall commence as provided in Paragraph 1 of said 
agreement shall be June 10, 1985, rather than May 28, 1985. 
2. Compensation payable by the Lessee to the Lessor 
for the period between May 28, 1985, and June 10, 1985, shall 
be as follows: 
Week Beginning May 28, 1985 
230 Unit Hours x $35 $ 8,050.00 
Week Beginning June 3, 1985 
372.5 Unit Hours x $35 $13,037.50 
Total $21,087.50 
3. All other provisions of the leasing agreement 
shall continue unchanged. 
SIGNED this <5V day of^S^/l/zL. 2*85. 
L. A. YOUNG SONS CONSTRUCTION 
"LESSOR. 
/ rv- — 
By(//y^cT<^ 
Its" President 
TRANSPORT LEASING COMPANY 
"LESSEE" 








ED MIDGLEY 6c ASSOCIATES 
RAYMOND P. FENLON, RPR 
700 NEWHOUSE BUILDING 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84111 
2 
3 IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 






TRANSPORT LEASING COMPANY, 
A MONTANA PARTNERSHIP, AND 
TRANSYSTEMS, INC., A 
MONTANA CORPORATION QUALIFIED 
TO DO BUSINESS IN THE STATE OF UTAH, 
PLAINTIFFS, 
DEPOSITION OF: 
CALVIN L. RAMPTON 
VS 
10 L.A. YOUNG SONS 
CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, A 
11 UTAH CORPORATION, AND 
RELIANCE INSURANCE COMPANY, 
12 A CORPORATION, 
CIVIL NO. 85-8421 
JUDGE FRANK G. NOEL 
13 DEFENDANTS, 







TRANSPORT LEASING COMPANY, 
18 A MONTANA PARTNERSHIP, AND 
TRANSYSTEMS, INC., A 
19 MONTANA CORPORATION QUALIFIED 
TO DO BUSINESS IN THE STATE 
20 OF UTAH; L.A. YOUNG SONS 
CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, A 
21 UTAH CORPORATION, 
CIVIL NO. C87-1984 






1 IS THAT CORRECT? 
2 A THAT'S RIGHT. ONCE AGAIN, I'M SURE WITH BOTH OF US 
3 HAVING THE APPROVAL OF OUR CLIENTS. 
4 (WHEREUPON, DEPOSITION EXHIBIT NO. 3 MARKED 
5 FOR IDENTIFICATION.) 
6 Q MR. RAMPTON, I HAVE MARKED FOR EXHIBIT NO. 3 AN 
7 ITEM CALLED "ESCROW AGREEMENT AND INSTRUCTIONS." ARE YOU 
8 FAMILIAR WITH THIS DOCUMENT? 
9 A YES. 
10 Q REFERRING TO PAGE THREE, IS THAT YOUR SIGNATURE ON 
11 BEHALF OF TRANSYSTEMS INCORPORATED? 
12 A YES. 
13 Q DID YOU HAVE EXPRESS AUTHORITY FROM TRANSYSTEMS TO 
14 SIGN THIS DOCUMENT? 
15 A IF YOU'LL ASK ME IN INTERROGATORY, I'LL GIVE YOU 
16 THE FULL INFORMATION. 
17 MR. STEELE: AT THE RISK OF GUMMING UP THE 
18 RECORD, I DON'T UNDERSTAND WHY YOU'RE INQUIRING INTO THAT. AN 
19 ATTORNEY ALWAYS ACTS UNDER THE AUTHORITY OF HIS CLIENT. 
20 THAT'S THE NATURE OF THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT RELATIONSHIP. 
21 MR. FETZER: LET HIM DEVELOP SOME QUESTIONS A 
22 LITTLE BIT AND THEN WE'LL GET INTO THAT. 
23 MR. STEELE: ARE YOU TRYING TO DISPROVE THAT WE 
24 HAD AUTHORITY TO ACT FOR OUR CLIENT OR—I DON'T UNDERSTAND 
25 THAT. 
12 
1 Q I MERELY WANT TO KNOW WHAT AUTHORITY YOU HAD TO 
2 ACT. 
3 A IF YOU WILL ASK US IN AN INTERROGATORY, MY CLIENT 
4 WILL ANSWER THAT. 
5 Q ARE YOU REFUSING TO ANSWER THAT QUESTION? 
6 A YES I AM, AS A PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATION. AND I 
7 HAVEN'T THE AUTHORITY TO WAIVE THE PRIVILEGE, EVEN THOUGH IT 
8 MAY BE INNOCUOUS. 
9 Q DID YOU DRAFT THIS DOCUMENT*? 
10 A NO. 
11 Q DO YOU KNOW WHO DID? 
12 A MR. STEELE. 
13 Q THE ATTORNEY, LARRY STEELE? 
14 A YES. 
15 Q DID YOU APPROVE OF THIS DOCUMENT ONCE IT WAS 
16 DRAFTED? 
17 A YES. 
18 Q DID MR. CREER APPROVE OF THIS DOCUMENT? 
19 A YES. 
20 Q WERE THE ITEMS CONTAINED IN THIS DOCUMENT A RESULT 
21 OF NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN YOU AND MR. CREER? 
22 A YES. 
23 Q WERE THERE NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN YOUR CLIENT AND 
24 L.A. YOUNG CONCERNING THIS DOCUMENT? 
25 A I WOULD THINK NOT. 
13 
1 Q IS IT SAFE TO ASSUME THAT THE NEGOTIATIONS WHICH 
2 DEVELOPED THIS DOCUMENT WERE SIMILAR TO THE NEGOTIATIONS WHICH 
3 DEVELOPED PLAINTIFF'S EXHIBIT NO. 1? 
4 A PART AND PARCEL OF THE SAME THING. 
5 Q NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN YOU AND MR. CREER? 
6 A YES. 
7 Q ARE YOU AN OFFICER OF TRANSYSTEMS? 
8 A NO. I'M THEIR COUNSEL. 
9 Q LEGAL COUNSEL? 
10 A YES. 
11 Q ARE YOU A STOCKHOLDER OF TRANSYSTEMS? 
12 A NO. 
13 Q DO YOU HAVE ANY OTHER INTEREST WITH TRANSYSTEMS? 
14 A I'M THEIR COUNSEL. 
15 Q WHOSE IDEA WAS IT TO ESTABLISH THIS ESCROW? 
16 A I'M NOT REALLY SURE WHETHER MR. CREER MENTIONED IT 
17 FIRST OR I MENTIONED IT FIRST, BUT WHICHEVER DID, THE OTHER 
18 READILY ACCEPTED IT AS A COMMON-SENSE WAY OF MEETING A PROBLEM 
19 WE HAD. 
20 Q WAS THE DEVELOPMENT OR THE ESTABLISHING OF THIS 
21 ESCROW YOUR IDEA? 
22 A I JUST DON'T REMEMBER. WE WERE TALKING ATTEMPTING 
23 TO RESOLVE A QUESTION. WE HAD SOME MONEY HERE; THEY WANTED TO 
24 GIVE US SOME OF IT, BUT THEY DIDN'T WANT TO GIVE US ALL OF IT. 
25 WE DIDN'T WANT TO GIVE IT BACK TO THEM. SO WE WERE DISCUSSING 
14 
ADDENDUM "H" 
ESCROW AGREEMENT AND INSTRUCTIONS 
TO: The Continental Bank & Trust Company 
200 South Main 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101. 
IT IS AGREED by and between TRANSYSTEMS, INC., (Fed. 
I.D* #810240143) hereinafter called "Transystems", and L. A. 
YOUNG SONS CONSTRUCTION, (Fed. I.D. #870200278) hereinafter 
called "Young", that they will deposit certain* funds with the 
Continental Bank & Trust Company, hereinafter called "Agent", 
to be held, invested, managed and disbursed in accordance with 
the terms, conditions and provisions of this agreement and 
instructions as follows: 
1. Transystems and Young have endorsed a draft 
issued by the State of Utah and made payable to Transystems and 
Young jointly and in the amount of fel45,380.36. Transystems 
and Young herewith deliver and deposit to Agent said check to 
be held, managed, invested and disbursed in accordance with the 
terms, conditions and directions contained in this agreement 
and set of instructions. 
2. Upon receipt of the draft and upon receipt of the 
actual funds represented by the draft referred to in 
paragraph 1 above, Agent is authorized to taake disbursement 
from the sum deposited with Agent only to Transystems, Inc. in 
the amount of Ninety-Three Thousand Eight Hundred Twenty-Four 
Dollars (393,824) . 
3. Money received by Agent in this escrow which is 
not disbursed under the provisions of paragraph 2 above shall 
be deposited in Agent's bank in an interest-bearing 
Shearson-American T-fund or an equivalent interest-bearing fund 
or account* Agent shall have no duty or responsibility to 
invest any of the balance of the funds in securities or other 
property. The Agent shall have full power to manage, control 
and in all respects deal with all of the funds constituting 
this escrow, and shall collect any interest that may be payable 
thereon and add such interest to the said funds, to be held, 
administered and managed as a part thereof until such time as 
the provisions of this agreement and these instructions allow 
Agent to disburse said funds* 
4. The Agent shall be authorized to deliver or 
disburse the balance of the funds not paid out in accordance 
with the provisions of paragraph 2 above upon, and only upon, 
either of the following two conditions: 
a. In accordance with written instructions 
signed by both Transystems and Young or authorized 
officers of the same* 
b. Pursuant to the provisions of a valid court 
order. 
5. The undersigned parties, Transystems and Young, 
agree to pay to agent $250 management fee for each year or a 
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part of any given year in advance plus a fee for any 
extraordinary services or activity performed by Agent. All 
fees- may be deducted from held funds by Agent. Transystems and 
Young shall each be liable for one-half of all said fees. 
6. All notices, demands, or declaration of any kind 
are to be given by any party to any other party, it shall be in 
writing, signed by the party giving it or its attorney, 
directed to the other party and mailed as follows: 
Transystems, Inc. 
c/o Calvin Rampton 
1500 First Interstate Plaza 
170 South Main 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
L.A. Young Sons Construction 
c/o John Preston Creer 
1200 Beneficial Life Towir 
36 South State 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84ill 
The Continental Bank & Trust Company 
200 South Main 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
7. The provisions on the reverse of the standard 
Escrow Contract of Agent are incorporated herein by reference 
and attached hereto. 
DATED this / U ^ ""May of August, 19fi5. 
TRANSYSTEMS, itfC. 
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DATED this /^> day of August, 1985. 
L. A. YOUNG SONS CONSTRUCTION 
APPROVAL OF INSTRUCTIONS 
I have read the above agreement and set of 
instructions submitted by Transystems and Young and approve the 
same. 
DATED this day of August, 1985. 
CONTINENTAL BANK & TRUST COMPANY 




ADDENDUM " I " 
Paul R. Howell (USB 1556) 
Clark B. Fetzer (USB 1069) 
David L. Hughes (USB 4744) 
HOWELL, FETZER & HUGHES 
Attorneys for Plaintiff Reliance Insurance Company 
700 Continental Bank Building 
200 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
Telephone: (801) 355-1503 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
TRANSPORT LEASING COMPANY, 
a Montana partnership, and 
TRANSYSTEMS, INC., a 
Montana corporation qualified 




L. A. YOUNG SONS 
CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, a 
Utah corporation, and 
RELIANCE INSURANCE COMPANY, 
a corporation. 
Defendants. 





Civil No. 85-8421 
Judge Frank G. Noel 
TRANSPORT LEASING COMPANY, 
a Montana partnership, and 
TRANSYSTEMS, INC., a 
Montana corporation qualified 
to do business in the State 
of Utah; L. A. YOUNG SONS 
CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, a 
Utah corporation, 
Civil No. C87-1984 
Judge Frank G. Noel 
Defendants. 
The parties to the above-entitled action through their 
respective attorneys stipulate as follows: 
1. The following facts are admitted by all parties and 
shall be taken as true for the purposes of this action: 
(a) The hourly charge for single truck units (one 
tractor and one trailer) is $32.00 per hour. 
(b) The total unpaid hours for single truck units 
is 78 hours. 
(c) The hourly rate for double truck units (one 
tractor and two trailers) is $35.00 per hour. 
(d) The unpaid hours of double truck units is 1,451 
hours. 
(e) Summary: 
Single Truck Units 78 x $32= $ 2,496.00 
Double Truck Units 1,451 x $35= $50,785.00 
2. There is a difference of 8.5 hours between defendant 
L. A. Young Sons Construction Company ("Youngs11) and 
plaintiffs1 calculation of unpaid hours. The parties hereto 
stipulate and do agree to liquidate this amount by 
compromising their differences to amount to 4.25 hours with 
the hourly rate compromised to $33.50 per hour. 
(a) 4.25 compromised hours x $33.50= $142.57 
3. The total outstanding rental charge amounts to 
$53,423.37. 
4. No evidence of said facts other than this stipulation 
need be adduced upon the trial. 
5. This stipulation is limited to an admission of the 
truth of the facts stipulated. 
6. The parties reserve the right to offer evidence as to 
all facts not herein expressly agreed upon. 
7. This stipulation is for purposes of trial of the 
above-entitled action only, and the matters contained herein 




day of JuTte-. 1987 
A.yStee L^ erry 
(ones, ^ Jtfaldo, Holbrook & McDonough 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
_cw. 
David L. Hughes 
Howell, Fetzer & Hughes 
Attorneys for 
Reliance Insurance Company 
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ADDENDUM "J" 
F P 1 
R E L I A : C E nsrsiTR.A.iTCE c. DMEAJSTY 
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CONTINUING AGREEMENT OF INDEMNITY-CONTRACTOR'S FORM 
HOC HFRT 
THfS AGREEMENr is made by (he undersigned for (he continuing benefit of (he RELIANCE INSURANCE COMPANY, a Pennsylvania corporation (hereinafter.referred to as 
the Surety), for the purpose of saving it harmless and indemnifying il from all loss and expense in connection with any Bonds executed on behalf ol My one or more of 
the following persons, firms or corporations: • • • • • • , . 
L.A.YOUNG SONS CONSTRUCTION, Inc., a Utah Corporation 
(hereinafter referred to as Contractor). 
WITNESSETH. 
WHEREAS, the Contractor, individually or jointly with others, may desire or be required from time io time to give certain bonds, undertakings, or instruments of guaran-
tee (all of which will hereinafter be included within the term "8ond" or "Bonds"), and 
WHEREAS, upon the express condition that this instrument be executed, the Surety has executed or procured the execution of. and may hereafter execute or procure the 
execution of such Bonds. 
MOW, THEREFORE, ^'consideration of the eieculion ol any such Bond or Bonds and as an inducement to such execution, we. the undersigned, agree and bind ourselves. 
our heirs, executors, administrators, successors and assigns, jointly and severally, as follows: 
FIRST: To pay all premiums on said Bonds computed in accordance with the Surety's regular manual of rates in effect on (he date sard Bonds are executed 
SECOND: To indemnify, and keep indemnified, and hofd arid save harmless the Surety against all demands, claims. loss, costs, damages, expenses and attorneys' lees 
whatever, and any and ail liability therefor, sustained or incurred by the Surety by reason of executing or procuring the execution of any said Bond or Bonds, or any other 
8onds, which may be already or hereafter executed on behalf of the Contractor, or renewal or continuation thereof: or sustained or incurred by reason of making any 
investigation on account (hereof, prosecuting or defending any action brought in connection (herewith, obtaining a release (herefrom, recovering or attempting to 
recover any salvage in connection (herewith or enforcing by litigation or otherwise any of the agreements herein contained. Payment of amounts due Surety hereunder 
together with fegaf interest snail be payaofe upon demand. 
THIRD: To lurnish money (o the Contractor or to (he Surety as needed lor the prompt payment of labor, materials, and any other costs or expenses m connection with 
the performance of contracts when and as requested to do so by the Surety. 
FOURTH: To assign, transfer and convey, and each of the undersigned does by these presents assign, transfer and convey to the Surety, as of the date of execution of 
said Bond or Bonds, as collateral security for the full perlormance of (he covenants and agreements herein contained and the payment of any other indebtedness or 
liability of the undersigned to (he Surety, whether heretofore or hereafter incurred, the following: 
(a) All right, title and interest of the undersigned in and to ail machinery, equipment, plant, tools and materials which are. on the date of execution of any such 
Bond or Bonds, or may thereafter be. about or upon (he site of the work to be performed under the contract referred to in and guaranteed by such Bond, or else 
where for the puroose thereof, including as well materials purchased for or chargeable to said contract which may be in process of construction or in storage else 
where or in transportation to said site: 
(b) All ngnts of the undersigned in. or growing in any manner out of. said contract or any extensions, modifications, changes or aKerations thereof or additions 
thereto: 
(c) All rights, actions, causes of action, claims and demands whatsoever which the undersigned or any ol them may have or acouire in any subccntract in connection 
with said contract, and against any subcontractor or any person, firm or ccrooration furnishing or agreeing to furnish or supply faoor. materials, supplies, machinery, 
tools or other equipment m connection with or on account of said contract, and against any surety or sureties of any such materialmen, subcontractor, laborer zr 
other person, firm or corporation: 
(d) All right, title and interest of the undersigned in and to any and ail percentages retained by the obligee under said contract, and any and all estimates, pay-
ments, extras, final payments and other sums that, at the time of abandonment, forfeiture or breach ol said contract or such 3ond or Bonds or of tiie terms of this 
Agreement or at the time of any advance, payment or guaranty by the Suiety for the puroose of avoiding.such abandonment, forfeiture or breach, may be due or may 
thereafter become due under said contract to or on behalf of the undersigned, together with any and aif sums due or which may thereafter become due under or on 
alt other contracts, bonded or unbonded, in which any or ail of the urdersigned have an interest. 
FIFTH: Each of the undersrgned does hereby irrevocably nominate 3nd aooomt any officer of the Surety the true and lawful attorney-in-fact of (he undersigned. *»(h 
full right and authority, in (he event the Contractor fails or is unable to complete the work called lor by the contract guaranteed by any 8ond or in the event of the 
breach of any provision of this Agreement to execute on benaif of. and sign the names of each of the undersigned to. any voucher, release, satisfaction, check, bill of 
sale of all or any prooerty by this Agreement assigned to the Surety or any other paoer or contract necessary or desired to carry into erfect the purposes of this Agree-
ment: with full ri^ht and authority also, in such event, to dispose of the performance of said contract by subletting the same m the name of the Contractor or otherwise: 
and each of the undersigned does hereby ratify and confirm afl (hat such attorney-in-fact or the Surety may lawfully do in the premises and further authorizes and empo-
wers the Surety and such attorney-in-fact and each of (hem to enter upon and take possession of the tools, plant, equipment, materials and subcontracts and all other 
collateral security mentioned in (his Agreement and enforce, use. employ and disoose thereof for the purposes set forth in this Agreement. Each of the undersigned 
specifically agrees to protect, indemnify and hold harmless the Surety and such attorney-in-fact against any and all claims, damages, costs and expenses lhat may m 
any way arise or grow out of the exercise of the assignments contained in this Agreement and (he powers herein granted, soecifically waiving any claim which iny under-
signed has or might hereafter have against the Surety or such attorney-in-fact on account ol anything done in eniorcing the terms ol this agreement, assignments and 
powerof-attorney. 
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S I X T H * Tht( the entire contract price of any *wt referred to in a Bond or Bonds, whether in the posses the undersigned or another, shall be and hereby 
is impeued with a trust in favor ot Suttty for the payment of obligations incurred for labor, materials and serviu. in the performance of the contract work lor which 
Surety would be liable under such Bond or Bonds and for the purpose of satisfying the conditions of the Bond executed in connection with the contract. 
S E V E N T H : That if Surety shall be required or shall deem it necessary to set jp a reserve in any amount to cover any claim, demand, liability, expense, suit, order. 
judgment or adjudication under or on any Bond or Bonds or for any other reason whatsoever, to immediately upon demand deposit with. Surety an amount of money suf-
ficient to cover such reserve and any increase thereof, such funds to be held by Surety as collateral, in addition to the indemnity a f t j /deOy tJirs instrument, wjth the 
right to use such funds or any part thereof, at any time, in payment or compromise of any lability, claims, demands, judgment, damages, fees and disbursements or 
other expenses: jnd the undersigned, in the event of their failure to comply with such demand, hereby authorize and empower any attorney of any court of recordof the 
United States or any of its territories or possessions, to appear for them or any of them in any suit by Surety and to confess judgment against them or any of {hem for 
any sum or sums of money up to the amount of any or all 8ond or Bonds. w»th costs, interest and reasonable attorneys' lees, such judgment, however, to be satisfied 
upon the payment of any and all such sums as may be found due by the undersigned to Surety under the terms of this Agreement. Demp/id shall befsufficient if sent by 
registered or certified mail to the undersigned at the address or addresses given herein or last nnown to Surety, whether or not actually received. 
E I G H T H : Alt collateral security held by or assigned to the Surety may be used by the Surety at any time in payment of any claim. loss or expense which the under-
signed have agreed to pay hereby, whether or not such claim, loss or expense arises out of or in connection with such Bond or contract under which suc6 Co/lateral is 
held. The Surety may sell or realize upon any or all such collateral security, at public or private sale, with or wrthout notice to |Mfe widjerpgned x>r any of them, and with 
the right to be'purchaser itself at any such public sale, and shall be accountable to the undersigned only for such surplus or ref f la i fWof suc^oNalfcra^ouflty or tfc* 
proceeds thereof as may be in the Surety s possession after it has been fully indemnified as in this Agreement provided. The Surety shall not be lifturfor d t ^ a s e i 
value or loss or destruction of or damage to such security, however caused. 
N I N T H : The Surety shall have the right, at its option and in its sole discretion* 
(a) Jo deem this Agreement breached should the Contractor become involved in any agreement or proceeding of liquidation, receivership, or bankruptcy, volun-
tarily or involuntarily, or should the Contractor if an individual die. be convicted of a felony, become a fugitive from justice, or for any reason disappears and cannot 
immediately be found by the Surety by use ot usual methods. 
(b) To take possession of the work under any contract and at the expense of the undersigned to complete or to contract for the completion of the same, or to 
consent to the re-ietttng oi the completion thereof by the obligee m said contract Bond or Bonds, or to take such other steps as in the discretion of the Surety may 
be advisable or necessary to obtain its release or to secure itself from Ion thereunder. 
(c) Jo adjust settle or compromise any claim, demand, suit or judgment upon said Bond or Bonds, or any of them, unless the undersigned shall request in writ-
ing the Surety to litigate such claim or demand, or defend such suit, or appeal from such judgment, and shall deposit with the Surety, it the time of such request 
cash or collateral satisfactory to th" Surety in kind and amount to be used in paying any judgment or judgments rendered with interest, costs and attorneys fees. 
All damage, loss or expense of any nature which the Surety may incur under Section Ninth shall be borne by the undersigned. 
T E N T H : The Surety shall have the exclusive right for itself and for the undersigned to decide and determine whether any claim, demand suit or judgment upon 
said Bond or Bonds shall, on the basis of liability, expediency or otherwise, be paid, settled, defended or appealed, and its determination shall be final, conclusive and 
binding upon the undersigned (except is provided m Section timth (c) hereof), and any loss, costs, charges, expense or liability thereby sustained or incurred, as well as 
any and ail disbursements on account of costs, expenses and attorneys fees deemed necessary or advisable bv the Surety, shall be borne and paid immediately by the 
undersigned, together with legal interest. In the event of any payment, settlement, compromise or investigation, an itemized statement of the payment, loss, costs, 
damages, expenses or attorneys' fees, sworn to by any officer of the Surety or the voucher or vouchers or other evidence of such payment, settlement or compromise, 
shall be prima facie evidence of the fact and extent of the liability of the undersigned to the Surety in any claim or suit hereunder and in any and ail matters arising 
between the undersigned and the Surety. 
E L E V E N T H : The Surety is further authorized and empowered to advance money or to guarantee loans to the Contractor which the Surety may see fit to advance 
to said Contractor for the purpose of any contract referred to in or guaranteed by said Bond or Bonds: and ail money so loaned or advanced and all costs, attorneys fees 
and expenses incurred by the Surety m relation thereto, unless repaid with legal interest when due, shall be conclusively presumed to be a loss by the Surety for which 
each and ail of the undersigned shall be responsible, notwithstanding said money or any part thereof so loaned or advanced to the Contractor lor the purpose of any 
such contract should not be so used by the Contractor. The undersigned hereby waive ail notice of such advance or loan, or of any default or any other act or acts giving 
rise to any claim under any said Bond or Bonds, and waive notice of any and ail liability of the Surety under any said Bond or Bonds or any and all liability on the part of 
the undersigned to the effect and end that each of the undersigned shall be and continue liable to the Surety hereunder notwithstanding any notice of any kind to which 
the undersigned might have been or be entitled and notwithstanding any defenses which the undersigned might have been or be entitled to make 
T W E L F T H : No assent, assignment, change in time or manner of payment or other change or extension in the terms of any 8ond or of any contract referred to in 
such Bond or in the general conditions, plans or specifications incorporated in such contract, granted Oi authorized by the Surety or the refusal to so gfant or authorize, 
shall release, discnarge or in any manner whatsoever affect the obligations assumed by the undersigned in executing this Agreement of Indemnity This Agreement shall 
aooly to any and ail renewal, continuation or substitution bonds executed by the Surety The Surety shall not be required to notify or obtain the approval or consent :f 
the unae«signed orior to granting, authorizing or executing any assent, assignment, change or extension. 
T H I R T E E N T H - Until the Surety shall have been furmsned with competent legal evidence ot its discharge without loss from any and all 3onos. •he Surety stall 
have 'he ngrt at all times *o free access to the books, records and accounts of each or the undersigned for the ouroose of examining *he same £jch of the jndcsigned 
lereoy authorizes and reouests any and all deoositones in which funds of any of the undersigned may be deposited *o furnish to the Surety 'he mount 21 sucn oeoosits 
as of any date r;ouested and any person firm or corporation doing business with the undersigned is hereby authorized to furnish any information -eouested 3y the 
Surety concerning any transaction The Surety may furnish cooies of any and all statements, agreements and financial statements and any nformanon whicn it iow has 
or may herearter obtain concerning each of the undersigned, to other persons or companies for the purpose of procuring co suretyship or reinsurance or of advising inter 
ested oersons :r companies. 
F O U R T E E N T H : Each of the undersigned does hereby waive all right to claim any prooerty, including homestead as exempt from levy, execution sale or other 
legal process under the 'aw of any state, province or other government as against the rights oi the Surety to proceed against the same 'or indemnity hereunder 
F I F T E E N T H : The Surety shall have every right and remedy which a personal surety without compensation would have, including the ngnt to secure its discharge 
from the suretys.hio. 3nd nothing herein contained shall be considered or construed Jo waive, abridge or dimmish any right or remedy wmch the Surety might have if this 
instrument «ere not executed. The undersigned will on request of the Surety procure the discharge of the Surety from any 8onds. and all liability by reason thereof. 
Seoarate suits may be brought hereunder as causes of action mav accrue, and the pendency or termination of any such suit shall not bar any subsequent 3Ction The 
Surety shall be notified immediately by the undersigned of any claim or action which may result in a claim against the Surety, such notice to be given by registered mail 
to the Surety at its Head Office in Philadelphia. Pennsylvania. In the event of legal proceedings against the Surety, upon or on account of any said Bond or 8onds, the 
Surety may apply for a court order making any or ail of the undersigned oarties defendants, and each undersigned hereby consents to the granting of such aopiication 
and agrees to become such a party defendant and to allow judgment, in the event oi judgment against the Surety, to be rendered also against such undersigned in like 
amount and m favor of the Surety, if the Surety so desires. 
S I X T E E N T H * The Surety reserves the right to decline to execute any such flood, and if it shall execute any proposal Bond, and ti the Contractor is awarded fhe 
contract, the Contractor shall not be obligated to obtain any Bond or Bonds requirrd by the contract Irom the Surety nor shall the Surety be obligated to execute such 
Bond or 8onds 
S E V E N T F E N T H * This Apr^emmt shall in all its trrms and ijjrpp!nent<; br Inr the benrfit nf md protect my person or compiny |0imng with the Surety in 
executing said Bond or Bonds or any of trVro o» eirrtifing .it the request ol the MWI !y said Hum! «' Oumi, 01 .iny of thern <is * d l .is .my company 01 comjunics assum 
m^ co suretyship or reinsurance thereon 
STATE nr UTAH 
COUNIY nf ^ /Isrsts^ 
On this. 2 - 2 -
:} 
/ 
day o( / ^ f o f c < - < > ^ . . 19 S4
 be(ore me perjon,||r iBBtifnt A l a n G . Y n n n g , 
Saundra H. Youne. Stephen A. Young and T.»T*nri a Young 
'•' b 8 I 3 5 -
to me known and known to me to be the individoal(s) described in and who eiecuted the foregoing igreement 








On th is . TX2. 
Alan G. Youm* 








.before me personally came. 
to me known, who being by me duly sworn, did depose and say: that he resides in. 
(hat he is the P r e s i d e n t .offh»L. A. Young Sons Construct ion , Inc. 
the corporation described in and which executed the foregoing instrument: that he knows the seal of the said corporation: (hat the seal a ( ( i ^ V ^ f ^ T T # ^ { u m e n ( 
is such corporate seal; that it was so affixed by order of the 8oard of Oirectors of the said corporation, and (hat he signed hiVggjffHjffiA sjjri, iQnjinT^by 








nd cfrporatwyand ( t e sjgned his. 
Notarf^ ubbc. residing at /c?f ^ A/'t^f^Ul!3^&%^ ^ \ 
(Commission eiptres 
STATE O F . UTAH 
:OUNTY or sd&CscJ^, 
On this. 2r<Zr 
Sue Marie Anderson Young 
-day of. Ac&^z, 
o me known, who being by me duly sworn, did depose and say: that he resides in 
hat he is th# Pres ident
 u. >.,c ,~».y iw»- • , ^ ^ » , ^ -
fie corporation described in and which eiecuted the foregoing instrument: (hat he knows the seal of (he said corporation: (hat (he seal ^l^f*^Jpypui instrument 
; such corporate seal; that it was so affixed by order of the 8oard of Oirectors of (he said wrporatffa./and that > ^ n t d J i j j g j f r S y ^ h * saicTJ^ment by 
ke order. 






2 - ^ 
sai  «rpor< _ , . . ^ ^ 
Not public, residing at / ? « C 4 ^ ^ (^ ^^frSBG ^ \ \ 
(Commission eioires *.±*£>1&» ^ <*> x: 
nrPflP UTAH 
DUftrroF , s4Utsc<L<^ 
On this 
Alan g, Yowg 
-day o f . S^lyQftiii^il > 
C c 
.of the. Ame l n c a n Bui ld ing C o r R ^ a g g i ^ ^ / » o > 
of the said corporation: that the se^ j ^ e ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ T ^ m ^ yS m 
such corporate seal; that it was so aftiied by order of the 8oatd ol Oirectors ol the said corpocaljon^ and that he>r?ned hi«.i/I>»J*yf<said initrurn j^ft ttxX. 5 
me known, who being by me duly sworn, did depose and say: that he resides in. 
it he is th- P r e s i d e n t 
e corporation described in and which executed the foregoing instrument: that he knows the seal 
JMfaiy Public, residing j( _ 
(Commission f «0*es 
'*.«'•» in vf ur.f i n PF of 
1P0RTANT: Attach certified copy of Resolution authorizing execution of this instrument by Corporation. 
- ElvUlir.LNIM- llif uiulrtMKm-il n.iiM<il II- S I K I I lliem is specif* dW .mil brnclicialiy inleicJrd in II "i, , , ,«.nl.,rt a„n- r, i . , 
.-.;.- ccculnn. by any pa.lv. 5»all not allrd lhe . «,l tins obliganoo a< ID .my olhcoaMe e c i L I h e * T . 2 h . h .1 - K 1° " '" °' " " " ' 
..a h,Me hrrnindr, l,.v.,.„.„y „, a„y p 0 I l i n n nl , ,vm ol ,„„ A , ™ ' n, " K i T 2 i « e -nr 1 „.,",.„?» Y ? ^ " " . l ' " 'U"Y b0U"d 
shall n no way abroga e. waive or d.m.n.sh any rights ol Surely under Ih.s Apeem.nl. Ihe undefined acknowledge thai (he etecution 7 l t e J l m - n f a X 
££!32JSKwas no'made ,n rel,ance upon 3ny fepreMn,al,on mni lhe fc— '««•"" -^ JA^S^,SSi5 
^ . . I I ! » E I E , E N T I ! ! ' ? ? "!l , l" : l ,u^ers ,«ned " P ' " x , v ' « 0 « n "« »nd covenants thai (ins Agreement « a cont.numg obligation apply.ng to and indemn.Wm* the 
n S V " ,°f, ,K r* e' ' I " "0t C0Ve"d 0Y J"r ,0P ' ,C3"on S '«n t d by C , w , » e , w " such '«»«««» '<"« c ns.deredbetwe n he art.« e eto as 
T„ 7 l „ , ! P T " M H " A C°n"nT? .A?, , er e n ' °' l n d e m n"y ) h e r e , 0 , 0 , e 0 t h e , H , , t ' " K u , e d * *** «• °<h»> <* Contractor (whether « 1 rac. ne "one or ,s a 
Phiurnh , 5 H T T ?'" b e . C a n " , e d '" "" manner h e , e , n" ' t r prOV,ded An* °' lh« un<,»s'«"«d "»» noftyui. SuretT ts He d Offic in 
. « ! .hi.' h . ,"flSy «ma- °' s u , c V n d l r S ' g n e d s " " h d r r a l , rom Ih,s * « ' « " " • * " * h "<"'« * , « be sent by cert.fied or reg.stered mail and sh state when n t 
less than '»» ty days aMer rece.pt of such notice by the Surety, such w.thdrawa. shall be effective. Such undersigned «ril not be liable under this Agreement as to an 
Iz ;;:;"1 \ „ " y er'e ? . e c , , v e .da,e"such no,ce: p,ov,ded-,h",s to ,ny and aH such *»*«««««<»««•«»««• * * * ' " S o eV£2 
da e of such notice and as to any and all renewals, continuations and e.tens.ons thereof or substitutes Iherelor (and. .1 a proposal or Bid Bond has^ be"n executedo! 
K^ - ^ ad no'beefl SMved-Such w"hd,awalby any unders,tned S M I i n "°w " •"- ,h« - ^ r o , a n r o,hw undersigned 
TWENTIETH: That this Agreement shall constitute a Security Agreement to Surety and also a financing Statement, both in<icwr'da'nce w.th the provisions of the 
Uniform Commercial Code of every iur.sd.ct.on wherein such Code is m effect, but that the filing or recording of this Agreement-shall be solely at the option -,f Surety 
and that (he failure to do so shall not release or impair any of the obligations of the undersigned under this Agreement or otherwise arising, nor shall such failure be in 
any manner in derogation of the rights of Surety under this Agreement or otherwise. ; v 
\ *w 
Signed, seated, and dated this. 
ATTEST: 
1st 
-day oL January 
Bv : cr-i2nsv*f xS&ZoiL 
Larrv Gencrv, 2>ecrecary 7 
.(Seal) 
Don Naser, Secretary/ 









iMajpaKA. Young, IndividdaL Indemnitor 
rffc^ ,19. 
84, 
Alan Ge Young, ?rek±d^nc 
LAYS ROCX PRSS^CX^, I n c . / ^ ."' '"1 
.(Sea/) 




Lany^ . FYoung, Prejj^ient ;:.. r^ 




*Usjr.sr* sft* J^ *&/. ^ ' ^ : =• ($**i\ 
Young, Individiiai/I^t6reanitor 
Stephen ^/ Young, / i n d i v i d u a l Irfcietnriitor 
RELIANCE INSURANCE COMPANY^  
?Si (S«i) 
By:. 
IMPORTANT: Print or type the name and address of each signatory to this agreement. Each signature must be acknowledged 
- S e e REVERSE HEREOF. 
REuANCE INSURANCE COMPANIfcd 
RELIANCE INSURANCE COMPANY UNITED PACIFIC INSURANCE COMPANY PLANET INSURANCE COMPANY 
PHILADELPHIA. PENNSYLVANIA FEDERAL WAY. WASHINGTON FEDERAL WAY. WASHINGTON 
CONTINUING AGREEMENT OF INDEMNITY — CONTRACTOR'S FOAM 
This AGREEMENT Is made by the undersigned for the continuing benefit of HEUANCE INSURANCE COMPANY. UNITED PACIFIC INSURANCE COMPANY 
ANO/OR PLANET INSURANCE COMPANY, (hereinafter referred" to collectively as the "Surety") lor the puroose of saving each and all of them harmless and 
indemnifying each and all of them from ail Joss and expense in connection with any Bonds executed on behalf of any one or more of the following persons, firms 
or corporations: . . . , . . , ^ 
L.A. YOUNG SONS CONSTRUCTION, INC. A UTAH CORPORATION 
fiereinafter referred to as Contractor). 
WITNESSETH. 
/HEREAS. the Contractor, individually or jointly with others, may desire to be required from time to time to give certain bonds, undertakings, or 
istruments of guarantee (all of which will hereinafter be included within the term rt8ond~ or ~8ondsl. and 
WEREAS. upon the express condition that this instrument be executed, the Surety has executed or procured the execution of, and may hereafter execute or 
rocure the execution of such Bonds. 
OW. THEREFORE in consideration of the execution of any such Bond or Bonds and as an inducement to such execution, we. the undersigned, agree and 
tnd ourselves, our heirs, executors, administrators, successors and assigns, jointly and severally, as follows: 
RST: To pay all premiums on said 8onds comouted in accordance with the Surety s regular manual of rates in effect on the date said 8onds are executed. 
5C0N0* To indemnify, and keep indemnified, and hold and save harmless the Surety against all demands, claims, loss, costs, damages, expenses and 
torneys" fees whatever, and any and all liability therefor, sustained or incurred by the Surety by reason of executing or procuring the execution of any 
tid Bond or Bonds, or any other Bonds, which may be already or hereafter executed on behalf of the Contractor, or renewal or continuation thereof: or 
istained or incurred by reason of making any investigation on account thereof, prosecuting or defending any action brought in connection therewith. 
Uainmg a reiease therefrom, recovering or attempting to recover any salvage in connection therewith or enforcing by litigation or otherwise any o< the 
freements herein contained. Payment of amounts due Surety hereunder together with legal interest shall be payable upon demand. 
URO: To furnish money to the Contractor or to the Surety as needed for the prompt payment of labor, materials, and any other costs or expenses in 
nnection with the performance of contracts when and as requested to do so by the Surety. 
)URTH: To assign, transfer and convey, and each of the undersigned does by these presents assign, transfer and convey to the Surety, as of the date of 
ecun'on oi said Bond or Bonds, as collateral security for the full performance of the covenants and agreements herein contained and the payment of any 
tier indebtedness or liability of the undersigned to the Surety, whether heretofore or hereafter incurred, the following: 
fa; All right, title and interest of the undersigned in and to all machinery, equipment, plant tools and materials which are. on the date of execution of any 
such 3ona or Bonds, or may thereafter be. about or uoon the site of the work to be performed under the contract referred to in and guaranteed by such 
Bond, or elsewnere for the ouroose thereof, including as well materials purchased for or chargeable to said contract wnich may be in process of 
construction or in storage etsewnere or in transoortation to said site:: 
\b) Ml riqnts oi the undersigned in. or growing in any manner out oi. said contract or any extensions, modifications, changes or alterations thereof or 
lodi tions thereto: 
m 
mate 
sucn materialmen, succcmracror. laoorer or other oerson. firm or corporation: 
\c) All fjem tit!* and interest of :he uncersigned in and to anv and ail 3-rcentages retained by the ooligee unoer said contract, and any ana all 
Climates, oavmems* extras, finai oavmenrs and other sums thai at the time of aoandonment. forfeiture or^breacn of said contract or sucn 3ond or 
Bonos ir or :ne rerms of vhis Agreement or at the time of anv advance, oayment or guaranty by the surety or the purpose of avoidingi sucn 
aoandonment. foneiture or ireacn. may be due or mav thereafter become due under said contract to or on benalf of the undersigned, together with any 
and all sums due or wnich may thereafter become due under or on all other contract, bonded or unbonded, m which any or all of the unoersigned have 
an interest. 
TH: zicz of the undersigned does hereov irrevocacly nominate and aopornt any officer of the Surety the true a n d ^ ^ J ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ l 
lerstgned. with .'ml ngm and authority, in the event the Contractor fads or is unaole to comotete the work called tor by tfie con rac guaranteed
 &y any 
id or m me event of the breacn oi anr provision oi tins Agreement to execute on behalf of. and sign the names of & ^ l ^ ^ ^ l ^ ^ ^ 2 
.cher. reiease. satisfaction, check, bill of sale of all or any orocerty oy this Agreement assigned to the Surety or any o ^ J J ^ ' ™ 1 * S S m r S 21 
ired to carry into effect the ourooses oi the Agreement: with full ngnt and authority also, in sucn event, to disoose of the v*™*^**™^™* 
letting the same in the name of the Contractor or itherw.se: and aacn of the undersigned does hereby ratify and ccnfirm af11ito ^ ^ J ^ " 
Surety may lawfully do in the premises and further authorizes and empowers the Surety and such attorney-n-fact ?«*Mdi ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ 
e oossession of the toots, plant, foment, materials and subcontracts and all other collateral security mentioned mthis ^ ; ^ ^ ^ m J ^ ^ 
jtoy and dispose thereof tor the purooses set forth in mis Agreement. Each of me undesigned specifically agrees to P J ° " £ ' " ^ 
mless the Surety and such attorney--m-fact against any and all claims, damages, costs and expenses that may m any way a r ' s e ^ r ° w 3 c ° " l r ^ ^ 
t o f e o i m , r S S n m e m s contained in this Agreement and the powers herein granted, specifically waiving any claim whicn W ^ ^ ^ S X 
•alter have against the Surety or sucn attorney-.n-lact on account of anything done in enforcing the terms of this agreement, assignments ano 
w-fit- attorney. 
ccmract *ork for which surety wouio oe i unoer sucn oono or aonas ana lor me purpose tistying me conditions of the Bond o**rt,.»ri , 
connection with the contract. ouuu wecuiea i 
SEVENTH: That if Surety shall be required or shall deem it necessary to set uo a reserve in any amount to cover any claim demand liability **n*nc, 
suit, order, judgment or adjudication unoer or on any Bond or Bonds or tor any other reason whatsoever, to immediately uoon demand deoos.t i n h S 
an amount of money sufficient to cover such reserve and any increase thereof, such funds to be held by Surety as collateral in addition to the i
 Pmn 
aflorded by this instrument, with the right to use such funds or any part thereof, at any time in payment or compromise of any liability claims demand 
judgment damages, lees and disbursements or other expenses: and the undersigned, in the event of their failure to comply with such demand h-rPh 
authorize and empower any attorney of any court of record of the United States or any of its territories or possessions, to appear for them or any of them i 
any suit by Surety and to confess judgment against them c any of them for any sum or sums of money up to the amount of any or all Bond or Bonds wit 
costs, interest and reasonable attorneys fees: such judgment, however, to be satisfied upon the payment of any and all such sums as mav be found oue b 
the undersigned to Surety under the terms of this Agreement. Demand shall be sufficient if sent ov reoistered or certified mail to the undrsionec r in 
address or addresses given nerein or last known to Surety, whether or not actually received The authonty to confess judgment as set forth herein shall no 
be exnausted by any one exercise thereof, but may be exercised from time to time and more than one time until all liability of the undersigned to surety snai 
have been paid in full ' 
EIGHTH- All collateral security held by or assioned to the Surety may be used bv the Surety at any time in payment of any claim loss or exocns- whi-f 
the undersigned have acreed to pay nereoy wnetner or not such claim, loss or exoense arises out of or in connection with such Bond or contra-: und»i 
whicf such collateral is neld Thf Surety may sell or realize uoon anv or all such collateral security at oublic or private sale with or without notice t* •" 
undesigned or any of them, and with the ngnt to be ourcnaser itself at any such oublic sale and shall be accountable to t f f undersioned only to- *" 
surplus or remamoer of sucn coliatera' security or tne oroceeds thereof as mav be m the Suretvs possession after it has been lully indemnified as in » . , 
Agreemen: provioec Tne Surety snail not be liable for oecrease in value or loss o- destruction ol or carnage to such security, however caused. 
NIN'TW The Suretv snali have tne ngnt a: its option and in its sole discretion* 
121 To owm this Agreement opened shoulc the Contracto* become involved in any agreemen! or proceeding of licuication re-»iv»»snic n* 
bankruotcy voiun;ani\ o* invoi jntanly or should tne Contractor If an individual cie. be conviciec o*. a felony, become a fugitive Irom justic« or to* any 
reason oiS20oears anc cannot immediately be found b\ tne Suretv by use of usual methods 
(b» Tc take possession of tne work unoe: am contract and a: the exoerse of the undesigned to comolete or to contract for the comoletion of the 
same or tc consent tc tne re-letting of tne comoletion tnereof oy tne ooligee in said contract Bond or Bonds, or to taxe such other steps as in tne 
discretion of the Surety mav be advisable or necessary to obtain its release or to secure itself from loss thereunder. 
fc) To adjust settle or comoromise any claim demand suit or judgment upon said 8ond or Bonds, or any of them unless the undersioned snail 
reouest in writing the Surety to litigate such claim or demand or defend such suit, or apoeal from such judgment, and shall oeoosit with the Surety a: 
the time of such reouest. cash or collateral satisfactory to the Surety in kind and amount to be used in paying any judgment or judgments rendered with 
interest costs and attorney s fees. 
All damage, loss or expense of any nature which the Surety may incur under Section Nmthth shall be borne by the undersigned. 
TENTH* The Surety shall have the exclusive right for itself and for the undersigned to decide and determine whether any claim demand suit or 
judoment uoon said Bond or Bonds shall, on the basis of liability, expediency or otherwise be paid, settled defended or appealed, and its determination 
shall be final, conclusive and binding upon the undersigned (except as provided in Section Ninth fc) hereof) and any loss costs charges, exoense or 
liability thereby sustained or incurred, as well as any a'nd ail disbursements on account of costs exoenses and attorneys lees, deemed necessarv or 
advisable by the Surety shall be borne and paid immediately by the undersigned, together with legal interest in the event of any payment, settlement, 
compromise or investigation an itemized statement of the payment loss costs damages, expenses or attorneys fees, sworn to by any officer of the Suretv 
or the voucher or vouchers or other evidence of such payment, settlement or compromise, shall be onma facie evidence of the fact and extent of the liability 
of the undersigned to the Surety in any claim or suit hreunder and in any and all matters arising between the undersigned and the Surety 
ELEVENTH. The Surety is further authorized and empowered to advance money or to guarantee loans to the Contractor which the Suretv may see fit to 
advance to said Contractor for the purpose of any contract referred to in or guaranteed by said 8ond or 8onos: and all money so loaned or advanced and 
all costs, attorneys lees and expenses incurred by the Surety in relation thereto, unless reoaid with leoal interest when due shall be conclusively presumed 
to be a loss by the Surety for which each and all of the undersigned shall be responsible notwithstanding said money or anv part thereol so loaned or 
advanced to the Contractor lor the purpose of any such contract should not be so used by the Contractor The undersioned hereby waive all notice of such 
advance or loan, or of any default or any other act or acts giving rise to any claim under any said Bond or Bonds and waive notice of any and all liability of 
the Surety under any said Bond or Bonds or any and all liability on the part of the undersigned to the effect and end that each of the undersigned shall be 
and continue liable to the Surety hereunder notwithstanding any notice of anv kind to which the undersigned might have been or be entitled and 
notwitnstanotng any defenses which the undersigned might have been or be entitled to make 
TWELFTH: No assent, assignment, chanqe in time or manner of oayment or other change or extension »n the terms of anv Bond or of any contract 
referred to in such Bond or in the general conditions, plans or soecifications incorporated in such contract, granted or autnonzed by the Suretv or the 
refusal to so grant or authorize, shall release, discharge or in any manner whatsoever affect the ooligations assumed bv the undersigned »n executing (his 
Agreement of "indemnity This Agreement shall aoply to any and all renewal continuation or suostitution bonds executed by the Surety The Suretv snail not 
be required to notify or obtain the approval or consent ol the undersigned prior to granting, authorizing or executing anv assent, assignment cnance or 
extension 
THIRTEENTH Until the Surety shall have been furnished with competent legal evidence of its discharge without loss from anv and all Bonds. the^Surety 
shall have the right at all times to free access to the books records and accounts of each of the unaersigned for the ouroose 01 examining the same Eacn of 
the undesigned hereoy authorizes and requests any and all deoositones in which funds of any of the unoersioned mav oe deodsited to furnish to the Surety 
the amounfof such deposits as oi anv date reouested and any person firm or corporation doing business with the undersigned may be deposited to furnish 
to the Surety the amount of such deposits as of any date reouested and any person firm or corooration doing business with the undersigned is hereov 
authorized to furnish any information reouested by the Surety concerning any transaction The Surety may furnish copies of any and all statements, 
agreements and financial statements and any information which it now has or may hereafter obtain concerning each of the undersigned to other persons or 
companies for the purpose of procuring co-suretyship or reinsurance or of advising interested persons or companies 
FOURTEENTH Each of the undersigned does hereby waive all right to claim any prooerty including homestead as exempt Irom levy, execution sale or 
other legal process unoer the law df any state, province or other government as against the rights of the Surety to proceed against the same for indemnity 
hereunder 
FIFTEENTH The Surety shall have every right and remedy which a oersonal surety without compensation would have, including the right to secure it 
discharge from the suretyship and nothing herein contained snail be considered or construed to waive, abridge or dimmish anv right or remedy which the 
Surety miont have if this instrument were not executed. The undersioned will on request of the Surety procure the discharge of the Suretv from any Bonos, 
and all liability by reason thereof Separate suits may be brought hereunder as causes of action may accrue and the pendency or termination of any such 
suit shafl not bar any subseouent action. The Surety shall be notified immediately by the undersigned of any claim or action which may result in a claim 
against the Surety, such notice to be given by registered mail to the Surety at its Head Office in Madison. Wisconsin In the event of legal proceedings 
against the Surety upon or on account of any said Bond or Bonds the Suretv may apply for a court order making any or all of the unaersigned parties 
defendants and each undersicned hereby consents to the granting of such application and aarees to become such a oarty defendant and to allow judgment, 
tn the event of juogment against the Surety to be rendered also adainst such undersigned in like amount and in favor of the Surety, if the Surety so desires 
SIXTEENTH The Suretv reserves the nqht to deefme to execute any such Bond and if it shall execute any proposal 8ond and if the Contractor is 
awarded tne contract, the Contractor shall not be obligated to obtain any Bond or Bonds required by the contract trom the Surety nor shall the Surety be 
obligated to execute sucn Bond or Bonds 
-- - v» ».j ^ -JUM ui wumydiiy (uminy wnn me surety 
in executing said 3ond or 9onds. or any of the;. . executing at the request of the surety said Bo.iu or w-.»ds. or any of them as well as any company or 
companies assuming co-suretysnip or reinsurance thereon. 
EIGHTEENTH: The undersigned warrant that each of them is soecifically and beneficially interested in the obtaining of each Bond. Failure"to execute, or 
defective execution, by any party, shall not affect the validity of this obligation as to any other party executing the same and each such other' party shall 
remain fully bound and liaole hereunder. Invalidity of any portion or provision of this Agreement by reason of the laws of any state or for any otrier reason 
shall not render the other provisions or portions hereof invalid. Execution of any application (or any Bond by the Contractor, or of any other indemnity 
agreement by any undersigned for the Contractor shall in no way abrogate, waive or diminish any rights of Surety under Ifti^ Adrfeement. The undfeigned 
acknowledge that the execution of this Agreement and the undertaking of indemnity was not made in reliance upon arty%pr^e6enta&nWncOTin|oie 
financial responsibility of any undersigned, or concerning the competence of the Contractor to perform. 
NINETEENTH: Each of the undersigned expressly recognizes and covenants that this Agreement is a continuing obligation applying to and indemnifying 
the Surety as to any and all Bonds (whether or not covered by any application signed by Contractor — such application to be considered between the 
parties hereto as merely suoplcmental to this Continuing Agreement of Indemnity) heretofore or hereafter executed by Surety on behalf of Contractor 
(whether contracting alone or as a Co-adventure} until this Agreement shall be canceled in the manner hereinafter provided. Any of the undersigned may 
notify the Surety(ies) at its Head Office of such undersigned withdrawl from this Agreement: such notice shall be sent by certified or registered mail and shall 
state when, not less than thirty days after receipt of such notice by the Surety, such withdrawl shall be effective. Such undersigned will not be liable under this ;••«* 
Agreement as to any Bonds executed or authorized by the Surety after the effective date of such notice: provided, that as to any and all such 8onds executed by<—> 
the Surety prior to effective date of such notice and as to any and all renewals, continuations and extensions thereof or substitutions therefor (and. if a proposal ' 
or Sid Bond has been executed or authorized prior to such effective date, as to any contract Bond executed pursuant thereto) regardless of when the same are 
executed, such undersigned shall be and remain fully liable hereunder, as if said notice had not been served. Such withdrawal by any undersigned shall in no 
way affect the obligation of any other undersigned who has given no such notice of termination. 
TWENTIETH: That this Agreement shall constitute a Security Agreement to Surety and also a Financing Statement, both in accordance with the 
provisions at foe Uniform Commercial Code of every jurisdiction wherein such Code is in effect, but that the filing or recording of this Agreement shall be 
safely at the option of Surety and that the failure to do so shall not release or impair any of the obligations of the undersigned under this Agreement or 
otherwise arising, nor shall such failure be in any manner in derogation of the rights of Surety under this Agreement or otherwise. 
Name of Surety(ies) \y/ \ / 
By: '• 
M P O R T A N T : Print or type the name and address of each signatory to this agreement. Each signature 
acknowledged — See REVERSE HEREOF. 
3TATE OF /jyv(>L 
COUNTY HP <SIPA IcJDl. ss. 
- day of. \Sft<y\ /O0" tn ,s y ,f~~ daV ° l > > " V h 'r«rV* «*n J ? - £ ^ befou! me personally appeared. 
^fo flirt/f P {/jrt&1jtA/r* Sis*. u Z 
to me known and known to me to be the individual(s) described in and who executed the toregoinp^aoreement and acknowledged that he 
executed the same tor the purposes, considerations and uses therein set forth as / h t £ hee and voluntary act and Deed 
JUfjnt Q* l-?/ftX*C. 
Notary Public, residing ^ rfsV/nAJ JL 
(Commission amin»* & 'c~/f'*-¥(c__ 
<L/ ST*TE0=. 
COUNTY QrJ^LL^LLJL ss. 
On this. . s*\ day m \\U>K£^a,sf f~ 
> L 
ic g < before me personally came 
( /tn. (r LS''~'<nGt, 
<i 2 -
tc me known who being by me duly sworn, die oeoose and say: that he resides in _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . 
that he is the of the 
the corporation described in and which executed the foregoing instrument: that he knows theyseai of the s^TScorporation. and that he sioned his name to 
the said instrument by like order. _ -d//tots , c -TO/)/Kf&> __ 
Notary Public, residing at S~£ncnstsj~L*C* / L J > . 
(Commission expires 
STATE OF _ 
COUNTY OF. SS. 
On this- , day oL 19. before me personally came 
to me known who being by me duly sworn, did depose and say: that he resides in . 
that he is \Ut of the 
the corporation described in and which executed the foregoing instrument: that he knows the seal of the said corporation, and that he signed his name to 
the said instrument by like order. - . -












STATE OF _ 
COUNTY OF. ss. 
On this- , dav oL , 1 9 . before me personally came 
to me known who being by me duly sworn, did deoose and say: that he resides in _ _ • 
that he is the of t h e _ _ 
the corporation described in and which executed the foregoing instrument: that he knows the seal of the said corporation, and that he signed his name to 
the said instrument by like order. _ _ _ _ _ - _ . _ _ — _ _ - _ — _ _ _ . 















IMPORTANT: Attach certified copy - * Resolution authorizing execution of this instr -nt by Corporation. 
ADDENDUM "K" 
Utah Code Ann. Section 38-1-3 (Supp. 1987) 
38-1-3. Those entitled to lien — What may be attached. 
Contractors, subcontractors, and all persons performing 
any servicers or furnishing or renting any materials or 
equipment used in the construction, alteration, or 
improvement of any building or structure or improvement to 
any premises in any manner and licensed architects and 
engineers and artisans who have furnished designs, plats, 
plans, maps, specifications, drawings, estimates of cost, 
surveys or superintendence, or who have rendered other like 
professional service, or bestowed labor, shall have a lien 
upon the property upon or concerning which they have 
rendered service, performed labor, or furnished or rented 
materials or equipment for the value of the service 
rendered, labor performed, or materials or equipment 
furnished or rented by each respectively, whether at the 
instance of the owner or of any other person acting by his 
authority as agent, contractor, or otherwise. This lien 
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§ 23.5 CGL 459 
agree to hold the surety harmless from losses. After evaluation of a contrac-
tor the surety may require from the principal, and often from the individuals 
who are owners or officers of the company and their spouses, an indemnity 
agreement. The indemnity agreement constitutes part of the consideration 
to the surety for executing bonds. Based on the investigation, the surety 
company will determine the maximum amount of bonding available to any 
one contractor. This is analogous to a bank line of credit.5 
Hart and Kane, of course, describe an ideal world. While it is usually 
stated that the bond requirement should act as a preliminary screen, at 
times depending upon the bonding capacity available and the general state 
of the money market, this preliminary screen can be perfunctory. Yet they 
are accurate in their description of the surety's function, that of providing 
advance credit, a function illustrated by the aphorism that a surety never 
expects to take a loss. 
It is important to note that while an insurer can not seek to recover its 
loss from its insured, a surety has a variety of methods to reimburse itself, 
one of which is a claim against its principal and anyone who has agreed to 
indemnify the surety. 
§ 23.5 A201: Comprehensive General Liability 
Insurance (CGL) 
The owner under A201 requires the contractor to carry comprehensive li-
ability insurance (CGL) which covers particular risks. CGL insurance 
requires the insurer to indemnify and defend the insured if certain types 
of claims are made for which the insured may be liable. The insurance 
required by U 11.1.1 recognizes that claims will be made against the con-
tractor "which arise out of or result from the Contractor's operations 
under the Contract." Some of the types of coverage required by that para-
graph are claims under workers' compensation law (an employee of the 
contractor may be injured while working and make a workers' compensa-
tion claim), claims for damages relating to injury or death of the contrac-
tor's employees (injuries not covered by workers' compensation may be 
the basis of a tort claim), claims for injury or death by persons other than 
employees (an inspector or letter courier may be injured while on the site), 
claims for damages to property other than the work itself (a supplier's 
truck may be damaged while on the site), and claims connected to the 
operation of a motor vehicle (a person may be injured by operation of a 
dump truck on the site or at its entrance). A contractor who wants to stay 
in business and who has assets to lose will probably already be carrying 
5
 Id. at 679. 
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the liability insurance A201 11 11.1.1 requires under a blanket coverage 
policy. Usually she adds a special endorsement to this policy for the par-
ticular project. 
Why docs the owner require that this insurance be carried? First, from 
a selfish position, the owner is less likely to be sued if the contractor car-
ries adequate insurance. The contractor is, in legal terms, an independent 
contractor, a status which can absolve the owner from liability for the con-
tractor's acts. Yet the owner may be liable if one of the many exceptions to 
this rule applies. 
Second, the owner, even one who would not be liable, is likely to want 
those harmed by her contractor to be compensated. 
§ 23-6 —Types: Occurrence and Claims Made 
Historically, insurance is divided into a multitude of lines. A homeowner 
at the turn of the century would have one policy for her fire and extended 
coverage, one for the contents of her house and another for her liability. 
Theft might be protected against by a fourth. A homeowner today is likely 
to have one policy for all these coverages. 
But in the commercial world there are still special lines. This accounts 
for the long list of required coverage in U 11.1.1, particularly the many 
types of insurance for personal injury.6 Over the years this list has tended 
to grow. For example, in 1976, A201 added coverage to deal with personal 
harm caused by the operation of motor vehicles. The amount of coverage 
is specified in the Supplementary Conditions.7 
Importantly, Tl 11.1.1.5, which deals with claims for damage to prop-
erty, docs not require that insurance cover damage to the work itself. This 
is dealt with by property insurance or what is called builder's risk in-
surance, to be discussed later.8 But increasingly claims by the owner for 
defective work performed negligently by the contractor are brought under 
completed operations provisions. These will be discussed in § 23.7. 
CGL policies are being written where permitted on a claims made basis. 
Such policies cover only those claims which are made during the policy 
period, a coverage common in professional liability insurance.9 Occur-
rence policies cover liability for acts which occur during the policy period. 
A201 11 11.1.2 docs not specify which must be obtained. It simply notes 
the different types and leaves it to the contractor (or more realistically, 
6
 See Rothschild at 25-30 for an analysis of the types of coverage under A201 TI 11.1 
(1976). 
7
 See Rothschild at 29-30. 
RSee§ 23.11. 
9
 See Sweet § 18.05(D). 
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to the insurance regulators) to obtain what is available. The owner would 
prefer that the contractor obtain occurrence coverage when possible. 
§ 23.7 —Duration: Completed Operations 
A201 H 11.1.2 states that coverage "shall be maintained without interrup-
tion from date of commencement of the Work until date of final payment 
and termination of any coverage required to be maintained after final 
payment" from the owner. If the contractor wishes to commence prior to 
the effective date of insurance, H 8.2.2 requires that she receive written 
permission from the owner. 
CGL coverage excludes liability for property in the "care, custody or 
control" of the contractor. Insurers do not protect property owned by the 
insured (this should be covered by property insurance) and "care, custody 
or control" is considered equivalent to ownership. This exclusion applies 
while the work is performed. Also, coverage generally excludes "work 
product" of the contractor, that is, work done by her on her behalf. These 
are ordinary business risks, and coverage could encourage poor work. 
But greater coverage can be obtained by broad form property damage 
endorsement, including completed operations. Rothschild states such cov-
erage was "intended to include protection against claims for bodily injury 
or property damage . . . after the Contractor has closed out the Proj-
ect."10 This can provide coverage to the contractor for the defective work 
of subcontractors and the consequential damages caused by the contrac-
tor's own work. All that is excluded is the prime contractor's own defec-
tive work. 
Increasingly contractors claim coverage on their CGL policies if owners 
make claims against them for defective work discovered after completion. 
This coverage, if found, is useful to both owner (a new deep pocket) and 
contractor (no subrogation claims by her insurer against her as she is the 
insured). 
While some courts have allowed recovery, most have not.11 Those that 
deny coverage point to the "work product" or "care, custody and con-
trol" exclusion, as well as exclusions for work performed by or on behalf 
of the insured. A broad form property damage endorsement (including 
completed operations) would cover subcontractor work. 
10
 See Rothschild at 27. 
11
 Compare Commercial Union Assurance Cos. v. Gollan, 118 N.II. 744, 394 A.2d 839 
(1978) with Wccdo v. Stone IZ-Brick, Inc., 81 NJ. 233, 405 A.2d 788 (1979). See gener-
ally Landis and Rahdert, The Completed Operations Hazard, 19 Forum 570 (1984) 
reprinted in the Comprehensive General Liability Policy: A Critique of Selected Provi-
sions (American Bar Association 1985). See also § 13.12. 
A201 GENERAL CONDITIONS: CONSTRl 
ARTICLE 10 
PROTECTION OF PERSONS AND PROPERTY 
10 t SAFETY PRECAUTIONS ANO PROGRAMS 
10 1 1 The Contractor shall l>e responsible for initiating main 
taming arid supervising ail safety prccjmkms and programs in 
connection with the performance of ihe Contract 
10 1 2 In the eveni the Contractor encounters on ihe site 
materul reasonably believed to he asbestos or poly chloi mated 
hiphcnyl (I'CIl) v*. hit It has not been rendcied harmless the 
Contractor shall immediaicl) slop >Xork in the area alfcuecl 
and report the condition to the Ownci and Architect in writing 
The Work in the affected area shall not thereafter be resinned 
except h> wniicn agreement of ilie Owner and ( oniracior il in 
fart the materul is asl>estos i * polychlorinaied biphenyl (PC I)) 
jnd has not IKTCIJ rendered harmless 1 he VI ork in the ahcctcd 
arra shall l»c resumed in the absence of asl»cstos or polychton 
nated biphenyl (PC It) or when it has been rendered haunltss 
h\ written agreement of the Owner and Contractor or in 
accordance with final determinatH>n by the Architect on wlmh 
arbitration has not IKTCH demanded or h> arhiiranon under 
ArtKle 4 
10 1 3 The Contractor shall not lie required pursuant to ArtKle 
" to pcrlofin without consent any Work t^ftuMcig to asl>esiosoi 
polychlorinaied biphenyl (l'( It) 
10 1 4 lo the fullest extent permittee 
indemnity and hold haimless the ( 
led s consultants and agents ami en»|: 
front ami against claims damages tosses aiul 
ing hut not limited to attorneys ftcs arising out of 
ft*MII performance of (he Work in the adct ted aiea if 
maiciiat is asbestos or jiolychlorinated htphen\i (PC H) ami 
not licen tcmkicd harmless provided that SIH.II claim damage 
|ossorcx|>cu<* is attributable to bodily miury sickness disease 
or death or to ui|in\ lo or cksiciiviion oi tangible pto|Kits 
(other than the Work itscll) including loss of use resulting 
ihcrelrom but only to the extent cause il in whole or in pan by 
negligent acts or omissions of the Owner anyone dirrctly or 
induced) employed b> die Owner or anyone lor wliose acts 
the Owner nu% l»c liable regirdlcss of whether or not such 
claim damage loss or expense i> caused in part by a parti 
indemnified hereunder Such obligation sball not be construed 
to nc^itc ahnili,e or reduce other rights or obligations of 
indemnity whi<h would otheIW tic exist as to a part) or person 
elescnhcd in this Mihparagraph IO I <t 
10 2 SAFETY OF PERSONS AND PROPERTY 
10 2 1 The Contractor shall take reasonable precautions for 
salctv of and shall provide reasonahlt protection to prevent 
elamage iniurv or loss to 
1 cmplovccs on the Work and other persons who mav 
be allectcd thcicby 
2 the \X ork and materials anel equipment to lie incorpo 
rated therein whether tn storage on or ofl the site, 
untier care custody or control ol the <onttactor or 
ihe Contractors Subcontractors or Sub sunt omrac 
tors an* I 
3 other property at Ihe site or adjacent then to sueh as 
trees shrubs lawns walks pj\tmenis roadways 
structures ami utilities not designated for tcmov al relo-
cation or iqtlat intent in the course eif construction 
10 2 2 The Contractor shall give notices and comply wiih 
apj>licable laws ordinances niles tegulaiuMis and lawful orders 
of public authorities tearing on satcty of -yrrsons or property or 
their protection from damage tnntry or k»ss 
10 2 3 The Contrae tor shall erect and maintain as required by 
existing conditions and petlonnance of the Contract reason 
able safeguards for safety and fxotcction iiKludmg posing 
d mger signs and other warnings against hazards promulgating 
salely regulations and notifying owners and users of adiacent 
sites ami utilities 
10 2 4 When use or stoiage of explosives or other hazardous 
materials or equipment or unusual methods aie necessary for 
exciuiion of die Work the Contractor shall exeiuse utmost 
care and carry on sueh j> uvioes unikr supervision of properly 
qualified personnel 
10 2 5 "The C outracior shall promptly remedy damage and lovs 
(other than iUnugc or toss insured under propciiy insurance 
required by the Contract l>ocumcnis) to probity referred to in 
( lauscs 10 2 I 2 and Id 2 I 3 caused in whole or in part h\ the 
Coniiacioi a Sub* oniractor a Sub subcontractor ot auvouc 
directly or indiiectl) employed by any ol them or by anyone 
for whose acts they may I K liable ami lor which the C oniractor 
is responsible under C lauses 10 2 12 ami Mi 2 I s except 
damage or kiss attributable to aets or omissions ol the Owner 
or Architect or anyone directly *»r indirectly empkned by 
cuhi rol them or by anyone lor wliose acts either ol them may 
he liable and not aiiribtitable to the fault or negligent e of the 
Contractor 1 he Ion going obligations of tbe t onirai lot arc* in 
additfem to the C oniractor s obligations under I aragraph s }H 
10.26 1 he f outra« tor sball designate a lespousible memhci of 
iitj-aitnr s organization at the sue whose duty shall IK the 
aeiidems (his ixrrson siiall l>e the ( outracior s 
iiinlrss otherwise dr-signaicd hi die ( oniractor 
^ n e r ami Arc luted 
load • |w»rmit am part of the 
a> to endanger its salely 
10*s / I h e O 
const met ion y 
10 3 EMERGi 
10 3 1 In an emergent{^bscting safety of per* wis or pi open v 
the ( ontraetor shall act aNjrfVooiractot s discictiou to prv 
vent ducat rued damage Iniurv or kiss Additional compensa 
don or exienskin of (imc e (aimed by die < outra* tor on Kt out it 
ol an emergency shall t>e determined as provided in l'ju^ra|>h 
4 S and Aniclc 7 
ARTICLE 11 
INSURANCE ANO BONDS 
11 1 CONTRACTOR S LIABILITY INSURANCE 
11 1 1 The C oniractor shall purchase (rom ami maintain in a 
company or companies lawfully authoti/ect to eki business in 
the lurisdictkin in which die l'to|ccf is kicatcel such insurance as 
will protect ihe C oniractor from claims set forth lielow which 
may arise out of oi nsuli from the C out ra« tor s operations 
unekr the Contract and for whtchthcC oniractor mav I K Icgilh 
liable whether sueh operations \K by the C outracior or In a 
SulKonttaciot oi by amone directly dr indirccth employed In 
am of them or by anyone (or whose acts any ol them max IK 
habk 
.1 claims uniJcr workers or workmen s com'x-usaiiou 
disability IKIKIM aiMi other similar empknex iK-nctn Jet" 
which aie a)unable to die \Xork to IK (KtlornKd 
A201-1987 19 
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.2 claim* (or dam igt s Ive ause of hodilv in|urv, nccupa 
IHNUI sickness or disease or dcaili«»(il»r (aMitractor s 
empknces 
.3 claims for damages Ixrcause? of UKJIIV injut) sickness 
or disease or death of ati> person other than die (.on 
tractor s employees 
.4 claims for tlailiagcs insured h> usual ptrstmal iunirv 
liability cnvciage which are sustained ( I ) he a |»ei*»n 
as a result nl an nlicnsediiccd) or inclirt t ti\ related lo 
empknmcni of su«h person bv, the (ouiracioi or (2) 
In another perse in 
5 claims for damages oilier than to die Work iisrll 
I X I J I I V Of lUJIIIV I I I Ol ( ks l lU t l lOU of tauglhk p r o p 
eri\ including loss of KM lesulting thereliiNii 
6 claims for damages because of hotlilv Injure tk-aih of 
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 THE COURT: TRANSPORT LEASING COMPANY, ET AL. 
6 VERSUS L.A. YOUNG AND SONS, ET AL., NUMBER C-8S-R071. THIS, 
7 I BELIEVE, IS DEFENDANT RELIANCE INSURANCE COMPANY "J MOTION 
8 FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
9 MR. FETZER: YOUR HONOR, IT IS PLAINTIFF 
10 RELIANCE INSURANCE COMPANY'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
11 THE COURT: ON A CONSOLIDATED CASE? 
12 MR. FETZER: THAT'S RIGHT, YOUR HONOR, ON THE 
13 SECOND OF THE TWO CONSOLIDATED CASES. 
14
 MR. RAMPTON: I DIDN'T QUITE UNDERSTAND THAT. 
'l'5' MR. FETZER: WE ARE PLAINTIFF IN THE SECOND 
16 CASE, MR. RAMPTON, AND IN OUR CAPACITY AS PLAINTIFF ON THE 
17 SECOND OF THE TWO CONSOLIDATED CASES, WE ARE BRINGING AN 
I 
18 ACTION, A MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
19 THE COURT: NOW, I HAVE RECEIVED AND REVIEWED 
20 YOUR MEMORANDUM. WOULD YOU HOLD YOUR ARGUMENTS TO ABOUT 
21 FIVE MINUTES? 
22 MR. FETZER: YES, YOUR HONOR. 
23 THE COURT: YOU MAY PROCEED. I WILL ALLOW YOU 
24 FIVE MINUTES. 
25
 MR. FETZER: THIS SECOND ACTION, YOUR HONOR, 
1 INVOLVES AN ESCROW ACCOUNT, FUNDS IN AN ESCROW ACCOUNT. 
2 YOUR HONOR HAS RULED THAT THE SURETY COMPANY IS NOT LIABLE 
3 FOR DAMAGES FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT OR NEGLIGENCE; THEREFORE, 
4 THE ONLY ISSUE AS TO THE LIABILITY OF THE BONDING COMPANY ON 
5 ITS BOND IS THAT AMOUNT OF THE RENTAL HOURS. 
6 IT IS MY UNDERSTANDING THAT THERE IS A 
7 STIPULATION WHICH HAS BEEN OR WILL BE SIGNED AND FILED WITH 
8 THE COURT THAT FIXES THAT AMOUNT, THE AMOUNT DUE FOR RENTAL 
9 HOURS AT $53,^23.37. THAT IS NOW A LIQUIDATED CLAIM --
10 THE COURT: GIVE ME THAT FIGURE AGAIN. 
11 MR. FETZER: MY UNDERSTANDING IS IT IS 
12 $53,423.37. THAT IS NOW A LIQUIDATED CLAIM, AND IT APPEARS 
13 THAT RELIANCE'S OBLIGATION IS FIXED ON THAT BOND OBLIGATION. 
14 WE CAN RESOLVE THE MATTER IN THIS SECOND ACTION 
15 IN ONE OF TWO WAYS. RELIANCE CAN HAVE A CHECK HERE EARLY 
16 NEXT WEEK, PAYABLE TO TRANSYSTEMS IN THAT AMOUNT, AND THEN 
17 RELIANCE WOULD OBTAIN -- WOULD REQUEST THAT IT BE GIVEN THE 
18 RIGHT TO OBTAIN ALL THE FUNDS IN THE ESCROW ACCOUNT UNDER 
19 THE PRINCIPLE SUBROGATION. 
20 THE COURT: HOW MUCH IS IN THE ESCROW ACCOUNT? 
21 MR. FETZER: APPROXIMATELY $65,000. THE OTHER 
22 WAY TO HANDLE THIS IS PERHAPS BETTER. IT IS NOT NECESSARY 
23 FOR RELIANCE TO ISSUE THAT CHECK BECAUSE THERE NOW EXISTS A 
24 FUND THAT IS MADE UP OUT OF CONTRACT PAYMENTS FROM THE 
25 CONTRACT THAT IS THE SUBJECT OF THIS LAWSUIT, THE BLACK ROCK 
1 PROJECT. THAT IS THE ESCROW ACCOUNT. 
2
 RELIANCE'S OBLIGATION IS FIXED. L.A. YOUNG IS 
3 UNABLE OR UNWILLING TO PAY TRANSYSTEMS THE AMOUNT DUE AND 
4 OWING UNDER THE BOND AND UNDER THE CONTRACT, AND 
5 TRANSYSTEMS IS AWARE OF THE SOURCE OF THE FUNDS NOW IN THE 
6 ESCROW ACCOUNT, THE CONTRACT PAYMENTS FROM THE BLACK ROCK 
7 PROJECT. 
8
 THOSE ARE THE ELEMENTS OF EXONERATION; 
9 PARTICULARLY, UNDER THE SALT LAKE CITY V. O'CONNOR CASE AND 
10
 THE GENEVA PIPE V. S S H INSURANCE CASE. WHAT RELIANCE 
11 REQUESTS IS AN ORDER FROM THIS COURT DIRECTING TRANSYSTEMS 
12 AND L.A. YOUNG TO REQUIRE CONTINENTAL BANK TO ISSUE A CHECK 
13 PAYABLE IN THE AMOUNT OF $53,423.37 TO TRANSYSTEMS IN DIS-
14 CHARGE OF RELIANCE'S OBLIGATION ON THE BOND TO TRANSYSTEMS. 
15 THAT CHECK CAN BE IN TRANSYSTEMS,] HANDS THIS AFTERNOON. 
16 THE COURT: AND THEN THE BALANCE TO RELIANCE? 
17 MR. FETZER: AND THE BALANCE TO RELIANCE ON THE 
18 PRINCIPLE OF SUBROGATION. THAT'S ALL I HAVE AT THIS POINT, 
19 YOUR HONOR. 
20 THE COURT: YOU ARE CtAIMING THAT THEIR ONLY 
21 CLAIM TO THAT AMOUNT COULD BE THE $54,423 FOR THE RENTALS? 
22 MR. FETZER: BECAUSE UNDER THE PRINCIPLE OF 
23 EXONERATION, THE CONTRACT FUNDS ARE TO BE PAYABLE ONLY FOR 
24 BONDED OBLIGATIONS AND NOT FOR OTHER OBLIGATIONS THAT ARE 
25 NOT PROPERLY BOND CLAIMS. THAT IS CORRECT, YOUR HONOR. 
1
 THE COURT: OKAY, THANK YOU. 
2
 MR. CREER: YOUR HONOR, CAN I ENTER MY 




 MR. RAMPTON: I WOULD LIKE YOU TO INDICATE, 
* MR. CREER, WHETHER YOU HAVE AGREED TO THE STIPULATION THAT 
7 HAS BEEN SIGNED IN COURT BY THE OTHER TWO REGARDING THE 
8 NUMBER OF HOURS FOR WHICH L.A. YOUNG IS RESPONSIBLE ON THE 
9 I JOB. 
MR. CREER: I HAVEN'T HAD A CHANCE TO PASS THAT 
BY LEE YOUNG, WHO IS THE SOURCE OF THAT KIND OF INFORMATION, 
I TOLD COUNSEL THAT THAT WOULD BE THE SOLE ARBITER OF 
13 1 WHETHER IT WAS RIGHT. I DON'T KNOW WHETHER COUNSEL HAD A 
14 [ CHANCE TO TALK TO LEE AND VERIFY IT. 
MR. FETZER: YOUR HONOR, I DID HAVE A CHANCE TO 
16 I TALK TO MR. YOUNG, AND HE DID NOT HAVE A CHANCE TO VERIFY 
17 HIS RECORDS. WE WERE GOING TO GET TOGETHER IN THE FUTURE, 




19 THE COURT: DO YOU THINK, MR. RAMPTON, THAT MAY 
20 ] BE DETERMINATIVE OF THIS ISSUE? 
21 I MR. RAMPTON: NO, NOT AT ALL. IF THE COURT 
22 I PLEASE, AT LEAST FOR THIS ARGUMENT, THE BONDING COMPANY 
23 APPARENTLY ABANDONED OR AT LEAST HAS NOT URGED THEIR 
24 PRINCIPLE OF SUBROGATION, AND IT IS PROCEEDING ON THE BASIS 
25 OF EXONERATION, WHICH IS QUITE A DIFFERENT THING. HOWEVER, 
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